In the mid-1970s, Pakistan embarked upon the uranium enrichment route to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility; and as early as 1989-1990, the United States concluded that Islamabad had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device. Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient amounts to build 30-50 fission bombs. Various estimates put Pakistan's nuclear warheads at between 60-120 weapons.[1] Islamabad conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, shortly after India conducted its own weapon tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state.

In recent years, Pakistan has continued to expand its nuclear facilities. This includes a second plutonium production plant at New Labs, Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and a third plutonium production reactor (both under construction).[26] (In 1998, Pakistan commissioned the Khushab research reactor, which is capable of yielding 10-15kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually.) Thus, Islamabad appears to be expanding and diversifying its nuclear weapons capability through the plutonium route's more compact and powerful warheads in its quest for a secure second-strike capability against India.[4, 26] Reports in May 2009 from the Institute for Science and International Security provided further indication that Islamabad is constructing newer installations, especially at the Dera Ghazi Khan nuclear complex.[25]

In the first half of 2009, according to Pakistani news sources, the country's nuclear program underwent major financial cuts with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)'s classified projects being cut by 35%.[19] Financial constraints stemming from the global recession are considered to be the reason for these cuts. At this point it is unclear if this will impact ongoing projects, such as those mentioned above.

External Assistance

According to the United States, China helped Pakistan by providing nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance. In recent years as well, there have been proposals to expand nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Reports in 2006-2007 stated that China and Pakistan have conducted negotiations on the sale of six nuclear reactors to Islamabad, but no formal agreement was announced.[9] Subsequently, in late 2008 as well, news reports stated that China would assist Pakistan in setting up two power reactors.[22] However, other reports then asserted that the two countries have not concluded any agreement to build more reactors beyond Chashma 1& 2, which were contracted before China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in May 2004.[23] (The Chinese-assisted 325 MW Chashma-2 nuclear power plant will be completed by 2010.)[14] There is no approval from the NSG for supply of Chashma reactors 3 & 4 from China, and the United States government had stated in 2004 that it would not accept pre-2004 Sino-Pakistan nuclear agreements as being the basis for the two proposed additional reactors at Chashma.[23] Nevertheless, in April 2009, Islamabad reportedly approved construction of two new 340 MW power plants to be built at the Chashma nuclear complex with Chinese assistance.[21]

Islamabad has been critical of the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement but at the same time has sought a similar arrangement for itself, which has been turned down by Washington. In 2008, it pushed for a criteria-based exemption in the rules of the NSG to enable Pakistan to be eligible for similar treatment, rather than a country-based exception which would benefit only New Delhi. Despite these reservations, Islamabad joined in the approval of India's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by the board of governors of the agency in August 2008.[18]

Meanwhile, Islamabad has continued to seek external assistance for its nuclear program. Reports in May 2009 stated that according to Pakistani officials, French President Nicholas Sarkozy favored an agreement with Pakistan that allowed Islamabad to buy nuclear materials and equipment.[20] But subsequent clarifications by the French indicated that the cooperation with Pakistan focused on nuclear safety matters.[31] Moreover, any civilian nuclear agreement would have to be approved by the NSG, and there is no unambiguous indication yet that the 2008 NSG exemption for India provides the same concessions to Pakistan. In another recent instance according to a May 2009 Pakistani news report, under pressure from the United States, Islamabad turned down an agreement with Kazakhstan, apparently negotiated in late 2008, to buy uranium from the Central Asian country.[32] There was no corroboration of this development from other sources. Again, with no NSG approval such a proposal would be a non-starter even assuming the accuracy of the report.

Doctrine

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is centered on a minimum deterrent , and it has repeatedly eschewed a no-first use policy. Its nuclear posture is primarily aimed at deterring a conventional Indian attack.[5] Islamabad has not yet formally issued its nuclear doctrine, although there have been attempts in at least one instance by a senior military official to define the threshold of nuclear use.[6]

In an interaction with Indian journalists in late 2008, President Asif Zardari expressed support for a no-first use policy, which caused some debate, considering that historically Islamabad has refused to adopt such a posture against India. The offer was swiftly dismissed by most Pakistani analysts as ill-informed and reportedly the military disagreed with this proposal as well.[33, 34]

Islamabad has put in place a command and control system centered around the National Command Authority (NCA), which is the main nuclear decision-making body and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which controls the country's nuclear weapons and facilities.[15] The NCA is headed by the President of Pakistan. The SPD, which acts as the secretariat of the NCA, also oversees the Armed Strategic Force, which consists of the strategic commands of the army, navy, and air force.[7] Reports in 2007 indicated that since 9/11, there has been significant cooperation between Islamabad and Washington on securing Pakistan's nuclear facilities.[8]

In December 2007, through an ordinance, the NCA was formally and legally established, although it had been in existence since 2000.[16]

Nuclear Security

The security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons has been a key concern in recent years with the rise of terrorist and insurgent violence and the expansion of geographical areas under the control of the Taliban in the country. The fear is that such developments increase the likelihood of scenarios in which Pakistan's nuclear security is put at risk; scenarios such as (1) personnel working in Islamabad's nuclear program collaborate with militant groups and proliferation networks; (2) the Taliban captures nuclear facilities located in western Pakistan as they expand areas under their geographical control; (3) deliberate or inadvertent attacks on Islamabad's nuclear facilities; (4) persistent political instability negatively impacting on the strength of nuclear command and control.

Senior U.S. officials have expressed confidence in the ability of the Pakistan government and military to control the nuclear arsenal, but at the same time they concede that potential vulnerabilities in Pakistan's nuclear security remain a concern.[24, 35] The 2003-04 uncovering of the proliferation network run by A.Q. Khan had already raised questions over the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons from external and internal threats. It is in context of these dangers that there is concern about the overall expansion of Pakistan's nuclear program.[27]

On the other hand, Islamabad has consistently asserted that it has complete control over its nuclear weapons and that it is impossible for groups such as the Taliban or proliferation networks to gain access to the nuclear facilities and weapons. According to some reports in April 2009, with the expansion of Taliban control in western Pakistan, Islamabad shared some highly classified information about its nuclear program with western countries in order to reassure them of the country's nuclear security.[39]

Since 2007, Taliban-linked groups have successfully attacked tightly guarded government and militant targets in the country, raising questions over whether nuclear facilities are insulated from such attacks. Several Pakistani nuclear facilities such as the Khushab facility and the Gadwal uranium enrichment plant are in proximity of areas under attack from the Taliban.[40] Additionally, there have been some attempts to kidnap officials and technicians working at nuclear sites in western Pakistan, although it is not clear who was responsible and what their intentions were.[28, 29]

Regarding intentions, some internet forums reportedly involving Al Qaeda input have been hosting discussions on Pakistan's nuclear program. These discussions recommend that mujahideen operating in Pakistan should forestall Washington's attempts to secure Islamabad's nuclear program by capturing the weapons themselves.[36]

Islamabad has disclosed measures it has taken in recent years to strengthen physical security of nuclear weapons and installations.[17] Additionally, Pakistan has also put in place more stringent export control mechanisms, such as the 2004 Export Control Act and the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate exports of nuclear, biological, and missile-related products.[12]

It has also strengthened its personnel reliability program (PRP) to prevent radicalized individuals from infiltrating the nuclear program, although various experts believe that nevertheless potential gaps do exist.[38] Pakistani analysts and officials state that they have developed their own version of "permissive action links" or PALs to safeguard the warheads, and have not relied on U.S. assistance for this technology.[24] Nevertheless, in recent years, Washington has provided various levels of assistance to Pakistan to strengthen the security of its nuclear program.[37]

International Treaties and Initiatives

Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Pakistan has expressed its opposition because of its insistence that the FMCT cover reduction of existing stocks of fissile materials (to prevent a permanent gap vis-a-vis India), and because of its backing for a verification framework.[10] In general, Pakistan's position on nuclear disarmament has been that it would give up its nuclear weapons if India gives up its own nuclear arsenal.[30]

Pakistan is a member of some multilateral programs such as the Global Initiative on Combating Nuclear Terrorism. It has also been involved in the U.S. government's Secure Freight Initiative through the stationing of systems at Port Qasim in Pakistan to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials.[11]

Sources:
[1] "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 71-74, thebulletin.metapress.com. According to one Pakistani expert, Islamabad now possesses 80-120 warheads, see Thomas E. Ricks, "Calculating the Risks in Pakistan," The Washington Post, December 2, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com.
[2] "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007."
[3] Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, "Pakistan Nuclear Reprocessing Plant May Yield Weapons-Grade Plutonium-Kyodo," BBC Monitoring South Asia, May 7, 2007, Lexis-Nexis.
[4] Dean Nelson, "Pakistan Upgrades Nuclear Arsenal," The Times, July 30, 2006, www.timesonline.co.uk.
[5] Peter Lavoy, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability," Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2007, pp. 4-5, www.npec-web.org.
[6] See statement by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, in "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan," Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network — Centro Volta, January 2002, pg. 5, lxmi.mi.infn.it.
[7] "Pakistan Sets up Tri-Command Nuclear Force: Officials," Yahoo News Asia, August 9, 2006, asia.news.yahoo.com.
[8] David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, "U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms," The New York Times, November 18, 2007, www.nytimes.com.
[9] Khaleeq Kiani, "27 pacts signed with China: N-cooperation discussed: Aziz," Dawn, April 18, 2007, www.dawn.com; "Pak-China technical Level Talks on Nuke Power Sharing Underway," Press Trust of India, December 21, 2006, Lexis-Nexis; Farhan Bokhari & Jo Johnson, "Chinese Soft-Pedal on Nuclear Aid for Pakistan," The Financial Times, November 25, 2006.
[10] Shireen M. Mazari, "The FMCT Threat," The News, August 8, 2007, thenews.jang.com.pk.
[11] "Radiation Detection Testing Underway at Two Foreign Sea Ports," Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, April 11, 2007, www.dhs.gov.
[12] "Pakistan Joins Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Establishes Strategic Export Control Division," International Export Control Observer, June/July 2007, pg. 3, www.cns.miis.edu.
[13] Kenneth N. Luongo & Naeem Salik, "Building Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security," Arms Control Today, December 2007, www.armscontrol.org.
[14] "Excellent Safety at all Atomic Power Plants: Musharraf," The Hindu, December 18, 2007, www.hindu.com.
[15] See Khalid Banuri & Adil Sultan, "Managing and Securing the Bomb," The Daily Times, May 30, 2008, www.dailytimes.com.pk.
[16] "Musharraf promulgates ordinance to establish NCA," The Daily Times, December 14, 2007, www.dailytimes.com.
[17] See Michelle Marchesano, "Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan," Partnership for Global Security, Conference Report, April 2008, www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org.
[18] "UN Endorses India-US Nuclear Pact," The Australian, August 4, 2008, www.theaustralian.news.com.au.
[19] "Pak Nuclear Programme Faces 35 pc Cut," The News (Pakistan), May 1, 2009, thenews.com.pk/ top_ story_ detail.asp? Id=21848.
[20] Francois Murphy, "Pakistan Asserts French Backing," Boston Globe, May 16, 2009, www.boston.com/ news/ world/ asia/ articles/ 2009/05/16/ pakistan_ asserts_ french_ backing/.
[21] "China to Help Pakistan Build 2 Nuclear Reactors," The Times of India, April 19, 2009, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ China-to- help- Pak- build- nuke- reactors/ articleshow/ 4397480.cms.
[22] Shahid-ur-Rehman, "China Offers to Help Pakistan Build Two More Reactors at Chashma," Nucleonics Week, October 23, 2008.
[23] Mark Hibbs, "No New Sino-Pakistan Agreement Reached for Export of Chinese PWRs," Nucleonics Week, November 6, 2008.
[24] Mark Thompson, "Does Pakistan's Taliban Surge Raise a Nuclear Threat," Time, April 24, 2009.
[25] David Albright, Paul Brannan, & Robert Kelley, "Pakistan Expanding Dera Ghazi Khan Nuclear Site: Time for U.S. to Call for Limits," Institute for Science and International Security, May 19, 2009, www.isis-online.org/ publications/ southasia/ Pakistan ExpandingCPC.pdf.
[26] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi," Institute for Science and International Security, May 19, 2009, isis-online.org/ publications/ southasia/ newkhushab.pdf.
[27] R. Jeffrey Smith & Joby Warrick, "Nuclear Aims By Pakistan, India Prompt U.S. Concern," The Washington Post, May 28, 2009.
[28] "Pakistan Nuclear Staff Go Missing," BBC News, February 12, 2008, news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/ south_ asia/ 7240414.stm.
[29] "Pakistan 'Nuclear Kidnap' Foiled," BBC News, January 15, 2007, news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/ south_ asia/ 6264173.stm.
[30] "Pakistan Ready to Phase Out Nukes if India Does So," The Daily Times, May 24, 2009, www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp? page= 2009\ 05\ 24\ story_ 24-5-2009_ pg1_4.
[31] Asif Ezdi, "A Nuclear Deal That Isn't," The News, May 26, 2009, www.thenews.com.pk/ daily_ detail.asp?id= 179500.
[32] "Zardari Govt. Turns Down Uranium Deal For Pakistan," Daily, May 13, 2009, http://www.daily.pk/ politics/ politicalnews/ 10037- zardari- govt- turns- down- uranium- deal- for- pakistan-.html.
[33] "Zardari's 'no first use of nukes' Remark Takes Pak by Surprise," The Indian Express, November 23, 2008, www.indianexpress.com/ news/ zardaris- no- first- use-of- nukes- remark- tak/ 389561/.
[34] Bruce Reidel, "Pakistan and the Bomb," The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2009, online.wsj.com/ article/ SB10001424 052970 20365 850457 4191842 820382548.html.
[35] Peter Crail, "Pakistani Nuclear Stocks Safe, Officials Say," Arms Control Today, June 2009, www.armscontrol.org/ act/ 2009_6/ Pakistan.
[36] Abdul Hameed Bakier, "Jihadis Discuss Plans to Seize Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," Terrorism Monitor, May 26, 2009, Vol. VII, Issue 14, pp. 4-5, www.jamestown.org/ uploads/ media/ TM_007_23.pdf.
[37] Sharad Joshi & Togzhan Kassenova, "Pakistan and Cooperative Threat Reduction," Nuclear Threat Initiative, Issue Brief, August 4, 2008, www.nti.org/ e_research/ e3_ctr_pakistan.html.
[38] Peter Wonacott, "Inside Pakistan's Drive to Guard It's A-Bombs," Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007, online.wsj.com/ public/ article/ SB119629674095207239.html.
[39] Farhan Bokhari & James Lamont, "Obama Says Pakistan Nukes in Safe Hands," The Financial Times, April 29, 2009, www.ft.com/ cms/ s/ 0/ a92fbbc2- 34e4- 11de- 940a- 00144feabdc0.html.
[40] Simon Tisdall, "Pakistan Nuclear Projects Raise US Fears," The Guardian, May 3, 2009, www.guardian.co.uk/ world/ 2009/ may/ 03/ pakistan- nuclear- security.

	Updated June 2009