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Updated February 2010
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left the Russian Federation with the bulk of the massive Soviet weapons of mass destruction complex. This legacy has allowed Russia to retain its great power status even as its economy has collapsed, but the burden of supporting this oversized complex has strained the Russian political and economic system. Russia's nuclear and missile capabilities presupposes its crucial role in arms control and nonproliferation, while the remnants of chemical and biological weapons programs pose major environmental and proliferation threats.
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Nuclear
The Soviet nuclear weapon program began during World War II and culminated in a successful atomic bomb test in 1949. Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, is a nuclear weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to estimates by the Natural Resources Defense Council, by 1991, the Soviet Union had approximately 35,000 weapons in its stockpile, down from a peak in 1986 of approximately 45,000. Under the provisions of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty), the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal had been reduced to approximately 3,909 nuclear warheads as of January 2009. Although Moscow's stockpile size is uncertain because there is no accurate count of tactical nuclear weapons. The SORT Treaty requires Russia to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. Russia inherited a massive nuclear weapons production complex and large stocks of weapons grade fissile material. It is estimated that Russia has between 735 and 1,365 metric tons (t) of weapons grade-equivalent highly enriched uranium (HEU) and between 106 and 156 t of military-use plutonium.
See Russia Nuclear Weapons Profile
Biological
The Soviet Union ratified the BWC in 1975. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union violated the treaty by secretly operating a massive offensive BW program until it dissolved in 1991. The Soviet BW arsenal included the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia, glanders, and hemorrhagic fever. In wartime, formulated agents would have been loaded into a variety of delivery systems, including aerial bombs and ballistic missile warheads. Soviet BW scientists also researched, developed, and produced anti-crop and anti-livestock agents. Although the U.S. government believes that the BW agent stockpiles have been destroyed, activities that contravene the BWC may continue at a few military biological facilities in Russia. The Soviet Union also established a so-called anti-plague system, whose primary objective was to control endemic diseases and prevent the importation of exotic pathogens that could threaten crops, animals, and humans. In the late 1960s, however, the system also was tasked with defending the USSR against biological attacks. The anti-plague system continues in today’s Russia. There are reports that some countries, including Iran, have attempted to hire Russian BW specialists to help them acquire biological weapons.
See Russia Biological Weapons Profile
Chemical
During the Cold War, and afterwards, the Soviet Union had the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons, including artillery shells, bombs, and missiles that contained choking agents (phosgene), nerve agents (sarin, soman, and VX), and blister agents (mustard, Lewisite, and mustard-lewisite mixture). There have been allegations that the Soviet Union developed a new class of nerve agent (Novichok), estimated to be 5-10 times more toxic than VX. Russia inherited the declared Soviet stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of CW munitions and agents stored in bulk. In November 1997, Russia ratified the CWC, but financial and other difficulties have been an impediment to the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile.
See Russia Chemical Weapons Profile
Missile
Russia inherited most of the former Soviet Union's missile complex - although significant portions of the construction infrastructure are located in Ukraine — and it has maintained the capability to produce highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-propellant missiles of all ranges. The RS-12M2 Topol-M (NATO designation SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has been developed for silo basing and a road-mobile model has also now been deployed. Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces have announced that two additional regiments will be equipped with Topol-M weapon systems during 2010. In addition, a MIRVed variant of the Topol-M, the RS-24, was scheduled to begin deployment with the 54th missile division at Teykovo in December 2009, but it remains unclear whether or not this has taken place. In the meantime, Russia continues to extend service lives of existing types of MIRVed ICBMs. Russia has, however, been encountering technical problems with the development of a new generation of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Submerged test-firing of the new Bulava SLBM has been underway since December 2005 but the system has failed seven out of twelve launches. If these technical problems are overcome, then the missile will be deployed on board the new Borey class ballistic missile submarines. An upgraded variant of the SS-N-23, designated Sineva, was successfully test fired in July 2009 and will be deployed on renovated Delta-IV SSBNs, while the Air Force has reportedly begun to receive a new type of strategic cruise missile. Reports of exports and leakage of Russian missile technology to countries such as Iran, China, India, and North Korea have led to concerns that Russia is contravening its obligations as a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
