This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1983
South Africa begins a project on molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) for uranium enrichment.
—D.M. Kemp et al., "Uranium Enrichment Technologies in South Africa," Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa Ltd., paper presented at the International Symposium on Isotope Separation and Chemical Exchange Uranium Enrichment, 29 October-1 November 1990, Tokyo, Japan; cited in David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 384.

March 1983
A US CIA report concludes that research on both a gun-type device, using two modified naval guns, and on the firing system of an implosion device was conducted at the Somerset West explosives installation in South Africa, beginning in the 1973-77 period. Possible tests of nuclear-related high explosives were conducted at the Kalahari test site in 1977-78. The report notes that South Africa considered constructing a plutonium separation facility in 1977. The South African enrichment plant at Valindaba has been producing HEU since 1978, and the CIA estimates that it has produced HEU for "several nuclear weapons." The report states that the test site in the Kalahari Desert was intended for nuclear weapons, and that South African scientists expected a yield of 20 kilotons if they had tested a device. According to the report, the 1979 discovery of a probable nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert and the "international uproar" that followed, led Prime Minister Vorster to "order a halt to further nuclear weapons development." The report concludes that the CIA has not had any "direct indication of any subsequent activities in the weapons program." The report also says that South Africa provided Israel with 10 tons of uranium in 1963, and depleted uranium and natural uranium rods during 1972-75.
—Directorate of Intelligence, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear Military Cooperation, 30 March 1983, pp. 1-3.

August 1983
Framatome of France sends a repaired set of 18 control rod drive mechanisms to the Koeberg plant in South Africa. Meanwhile, the Koeberg plant undergoes re-welding and will be examined for leaks as a result of the disclosure that the Framatome-supplied plant had an undercladding cracking problem.
—"The Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant...," Nucleonics Week, 4 August 1983, p. 7; "South Africa Probably Would Not Buy Its Next Nuclear Reactor From Framatome," Nucleonics Week, 1 September 1983, pp. 9-10.

22 September 1983
The US government allows Westinghouse Corporation to provide technical equipment and maintenance at South Africa's nuclear power station.
—Die Transvaler (Pretoria), cited in "Paper Welcomes U.S. Decision on Nuclear Plant," Worldwide Report, 24 October 1983, p. 86.

1983-84
South Africa secretly hires 25 US reactor operators and technicians to work at the Koeberg nuclear power plant. The specialists are contracted without proper authorization from the US government.
—Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), p. 291.

1984
The AEC commissions the initial elements of the Valindaba semi-commercial enrichment plant. It is meant to produce low-enriched uranium (less than 5 percent U235).
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

1984
South Africa continues construction of a hot cell complex at Pelindaba that will be used to handle spent fuel. The South African government states that the facility will be used to examine "nuclear fuel associated with fabrication development," and not for reprocessing plutonium.
—Nuclear Fuel, 8 October 1984; cited in J.D.L Moore, "The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability," in South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 102; Director of Central Intelligence, "Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies," 4 October 1984, top secret document partially declassified and released on 27 April 1997, <http://www.foia.ucia.gov>.

31 January 1984
The AEC announces that South Africa "will conduct and administer its external nuclear affairs in a manner which is in line with the spirit, principles and goals of the Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and the nuclear supplier's group guidelines." The AEC will require safeguards as a condition of exporting nuclear material and equipment. South Africa is also ready to resume discussions with the IAEA on safeguarding the Valindaba semi-commercial enrichment plant, but not the Y-plant, saying that its new enrichment technology may be "compromised" if the Y-plant were open to international inspection.
—"South Africa: Nuclear Safeguards and Exports Announcement," Department of State Bulletin, March 1984, p. 57; Stephanie Cooke, "South Africa Will Require Safeguards as Condition for Nuclear Exports," Nucleonics Week, 9 February 1984, p. 1; Allister Sparks, "S. Africa Pledges to Abide by Nuclear Treaty," Washington Post, 10 February 1984, p. A34.

January 1984
In response to South Africa's announcement, the US Department of State sends a telegram to the US embassies and consulates in South Africa containing guidance questions and answers for the embassy spokesman to use on an "if-asked basis." In response to a sample question inquiring whether South Africa had already developed nuclear weapons, the spokesman is instructed to reply that the Department of State "cannot state that South Africa has produced nuclear weapons," and that US-South African discussions on the nuclear issue are "designed to convince the SAG [South African government] that such a step would not be in its interests."
—US Department of State, "South African Public Announcement of 31 January 1984 Regarding Nuclear Export Policy and International Safeguards," telegram from the US Secretary of State to the US Embassy in Pretoria, January 1984, pp. 8-9, confidential document declassified and released on 2 September 1987.

17 April 1984
Koeberg-1 commences operation.
—Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), p. 288.

25 May 1984
Pieter van Vuuren, South Africa's ambassador to Taiwan, says that South Africa will supply Taiwan with uranium if that country wants to increase imports for the generation of nuclear power. South African exports meet about 70 percent of Taiwan's uranium needs.
—Johannesburg Domestic Service in English, 25 May 1984; cited in "Uranium Pledged for Taiwan," Worldwide Report, 7 June 1984, p. 33.

July 1984
The Swiss Foreign Affairs Department investigates charges that Sulzer Brothers, a Swiss firm, is considering selling a heavy water plant to South Africa.
—"U.S. Asks Swiss about Rumor of Heavy Water Sale to South Africa," Nucleonics Week, 30 July 1984, p. 1.

5 July 1984
After being questioned by Brian Goodall, a Progressive Federal Party energy specialist, South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha confirms that since 1979, a number of countries have inquired about dumping radioactive waste in South Africa and Namibia. A sum of one billion rand was offered by the FRG and the United States for a radioactive waste site. The matter was referred to South Africa's Atomic Energy Board.
—Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 30 July 1984, p. 36; cited in "Radioactive Waste," Worldwide Report, 30 July 1984, p. 36.

27 July 1984
AEB Chairman Dr. J.W.L. de Villiers denies reports that Sulzer Brothers of Switzerland will sell South Africa a heavy water production plant.
—Daily Dispatch (East London), 27 July 1984, p. 14; cited in "Heavy Water with Swiss Denied," Worldwide Report, 28 August 1984, p. 14.

August 1984
South Africa and the IAEA resume safeguards negotiations, which had broken off seven years earlier, on placing the Valindaba semi-commercial enrichment plant under IAEA safeguards. South Africa remains unwilling to place the Y-plant under safeguards.
—"The IAEA and South Africa Resumed Negotiations on Safeguards," Nucleonics Week, 16 August 1984, p. 9.

21 August 1984
The French contractor turns Koeberg-1 over to South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom). In June 1984, the AEC had given consent for pushing energy generation up to 100 percent. Koeberg was issued its commercial operating license in August 1984, and Koeberg-2 is expected to go into full operation in May 1985.
—Die Burger (Cape Town), 21 August 1984; cited in "French Nuclear Power Reactor," Worldwide Report, 15 October 1984, p. 39.

October 1984
A secret US CIA National Intelligence Estimate concludes that South Africa has the capacity to produce nuclear arms "on short notice," and that it has stockpiled components for "several test devices or first generation nuclear weapons that use enriched uranium." The estimate says that South Africa could have produced enough fissile material for a first nuclear device by 1979. Furthermore, the estimate states that South Africa may have "leapfrogged the testing phase" to focus on weaponization and delivery of nuclear explosive devices.
—Director of Central Intelligence, "Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies," 4 October 1984, pp. 1, 16, 25, top secret document partially declassified and released on 27 April 1997, <http://www.foia.ucia.gov>.

29 November 1984
As agreed by France, South Africa, and the IAEA, South Africa's high-level radioactive waste products from the Koeberg plant are to be exported to France for reprocessing. France will be responsible for storing the final waste product.
—"International Nuclear Waste Dump Considered," Worldwide Report, 14 January 1985, p. 1; The Star (Johannesburg), 29 November 1984.

Mid-1980s
With approximately half of the tritium it received from Israel in the 1970s lost to natural decay, AEC decides to use the remaining material in radioluminescent exit signs.
—David Albright, "Slow but Steady," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 1993, p. 6.

Mid-1980s
Ten buildings are added to the Advena facility (previously Kentron Circle) to facilitate replacement of the gun-type devices with implosion type devices and to allow Armscor to diversify into conventional military pyrotechnics and missile control components.
—David Albright, "Slow but Steady," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 1993, p. 5.

1985
Armscor is reorganized to rationalize the nuclear program. The new organizational structure has eight divisions: Program Management and Systems Engineering; Engineering; Technology Development and Explosives; Finances; Security; Health Care; Operations Support; and Personnel.
—Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, p. 4.

1985
The weapons program stops funding an AEC project to construct a 150MW pressurized water research reactor at Gouriqua, in Cape Province. The reactor is part of an AEC project to produce plutonium and tritium. Only rudimentary civil engineering preparations were carried out on the reactor before its funding was terminated.
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 12, <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/
ir-594.html>.

27 February 1985
South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation's executive chairman, Dr. J.W. de Villiers announces that since the Valindaba semi-commercial uranium enrichment plant will not come into operation until 1987, South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) will have to continue importing enriched uranium.
—SAPA (Johannesburg), 27 February 1985; cited in "Uranium Enrichment Plant to Operate by 1987," Worldwide Report, 1 April 1985, p. 53.

4 June 1985
The US House of Representatives adopts an amendment to the Anti-Apartheid Bill that bans nuclear cooperation of any kind with South Africa.
—"The House Has Voted to Ban Nuclear Trade with South Africa," Nuclear News, July 1985, p. 17; Nuclear Developments, 25 February 1988, pp. 1-3.

7 July 1985
The second unit of the Koeberg nuclear power station reaches criticality, and commercial service is expected to commence in October 1985.
—"South Africa," Nucleonics Week, 1 August 1985, p. 16.

9 September 1985
President Ronald Reagan issues an executive order that places new restrictions on nuclear trade with South Africa, but still allows certain nuclear exports to South Africa. Furthermore, it does not preclude assistance for IAEA safeguards or IAEA programs generally available to member states, for technical programs designed to bolster nonproliferation, or "for exports which the Secretary of State determines are necessary for humanitarian reasons to protect public health and safety." However, Department of Energy Secretary John Herrington refuses authorization to allow US citizens to work at Koeberg.
—"Reagan Places New Restrictions on Nuclear Exports to South Africa," Nucleonics Week, 12 September 1985, pp. 7-8.

September 1985
After reviewing the nuclear weapons program, President P.W. Botha confirms that the program will be limited to seven fission devices. The government halts all work related to development of plutonium devices, ceases efforts to produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons, and limits production of lithium-6. The Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) program is reoriented from production of lithium-6 to production of lithium-7 for water chemistry control in power reactors. However, Advena personnel continue work on implosion designs and theoretical research on advanced weapons. According to Mitchell Reiss, at this time South Africa terminates preliminary studies on thermonuclear weapons.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): p. 6; David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 13. <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/
ir-594.html>; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 45; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, p. 4; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 16; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 16.

October-November 1985
Senator Alan Cranston and India's Chief of Army Staff General Arlia Vatdys accuse the People's Republic of China (PRC) of exporting nuclear technology to South Africa. The Senator also alleges that South Africa is importing LEU from China. The Chinese foreign ministry and Qian Jiadong, special consultant to the UN delegation, deny allegations of nuclear cooperation between the PRC and South Africa. The PRC's foreign ministry announces that notices have been sent to all countries receiving nuclear exports from the PRC that they must accept IAEA safeguards.
—John Felton, "China Nuclear Supplies," CQ Weekly Report, 26 October 1985, p. 2152; Worldwide Report, 25 November 1985, p. 18; Fujian Ribao (Fuzhou); cited in "China's Stand on Nuclear Cooperation Reiterated," Worldwide Report, 21 February 1986, pp. 4-5.

December 1985
At the request of US Congressman Edward Markey, chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, a fact-finding team from the Department of Energy investigates possible criminal violations by 22 American citizens employed by South Africa's Electricity Supply Commision (Eskom). The Justice Department concludes that the unintentional violation of the Atomic Energy Act by the 22 Americans does not warrant further criminal investigation.
—US Department of Justice, "American Citizens Employed at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station in South Africa," 9 December 1985, unclassified memorandum released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

1986
The Vaalputs facility, which is designed for disposal of low- and medium-level radioactive waste, becomes operational.
—Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, "AEC Corporate Profile," <http:www.aec.co.za/profile/profile.htm>.

1986
South Africa concludes research on excimer pumped dye lasers for the AVLIS project at the National Physical Research Laboratory in Pretoria.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Section10; South Africa," Second Tier Nuclear Nations: Laser Isotope Separation Programs Technical Citations and Comments, unpublished paper, January 1996.

1986
The Y-plant is used to produce LEU for a period of 11 months, because the semi-commercial Z-plant is not fully operational. The 3.25 percent LEU is allocated for use in the first four lead test assemblies.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

February 1986
AEC Executive Chairman J.W.L. De Villiers announces that the AEC will offer separative work units (SWU) from its Valindaba semi-commercial enrichment plant on the world market in 1988. The enriched uranium is to be sold at marginal cost, approximately $119/SWU.
—James Branscome, "South Africa Will Offer SWU on World Market in 1988," Nucleonics Week, 27 February 1986, pp. 1-2.

April 1986
Despite sanctions imposed by France against South Africa in July 1985, Framatome is still supplying the Koeberg nuclear power station with nuclear fuel.
—"Indigenous Nuclear Programme Thrives Under Sanctions," Nuclear Engineering International, April 1986, pp. 10-11.

23 May 1986
South Africa's nuclear relations with the West degenerate as the United States, West Germany, and the United Kingdom terminate cooperation agreements, thus ending 30 years of close nuclear cooperation. South Africa expresses concern that it may be unable to import equipment necessary to maintain nuclear safety.
—Hamish Mcindo, Business Day (Johannesburg), 23 May 1986, p. 7; cited in "Impact of Nuclear Cooperation Shutdown Viewed," Worldwide Report, 9 July 1986, p. 48.

June 1986
South African negotiations with the IAEA stall, as South Africa demands the right to withdraw safeguarded enriched uranium produced in Valindaba for nuclear submarine propulsion systems, and the right to abrogate the safeguards agreement should its rights and privileges as a member of the IAEA be curtailed. The IAEA finds these conditions unacceptable.
—Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread Of Nuclear Weapons 1987-88 (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 294, 438.

July 1986
The US Congress passes the "Anti-Apartheid Act" barring uranium imports from South Africa.
—David Fischer, "South Africa: As a Nuclear Supplier," in W.C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenges of the Emerging Suppliers (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 285.

7 August 1986
Two people die and two others are seriously injured as a result of a fire inside the Y-plant. According to Frank Pabian of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who was visiting the plant at the time, the fire was caused by flammable wax polish.
—Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa, 7 August 1986; cited in "Accident at Pelindaba Nuclear Plant Reported," Worldwide Report, 26 September 1986, p. 61; conversation with Frank Pabian.

October 1986
AEC Executive Chairman Dr. Wynand de Villiers remarks that South Africa's current 3.25 percent enrichment level is insufficient for building a nuclear weapon. De Villiers reiterates assurances that South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant is to be used for peaceful means.
—Johannesburg Television Services, 5 October 1986; cited in "Officials Examine Nuclear Technology Prospects," Worldwide Report, 13 November 1986, p. 67, Johannesburg Domestic Service, 6 October 1986; cited in "Country Said Self-Sufficient on Nuclear Energy," Worldwide Report, 3 November 1986, p. 66.

November 1986
A confidential memorandum from the US embassy in Pretoria to Washington summarizes an article that appeared in the 10 November issue of Business Day. In the article, Peter Lomas of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) claims the new South African enrichment plant at Valindaba will produce HEU for three purposes: creating nuclear weapons, nuclear fuel to supply their reactors at Koeberg, and a strategic stockpile for use in negotiations with the West and generating foreign revenue.
—US Embassy in South Africa, "Claim that Highly Enriched Uranium for Use in Nuclear Weapons Could Be Produced by the New South African Enrichment Plant," 10 November 1986, confidential memorandum partially declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

1987
The AEC's semi-commercial uranium enrichment plant is expected to achieve commercial production by the end of 1987. Valindaba has the capacity to produce 75 tons of 3.25 percent LEU annually.
—Energy (Johannesburg), 24 July 1987, pp. 16-17; cited in "Uranium Enrichment Plant at Valindaba to Start Commercial Product," Nuclear Developments, 28 January 1988, pp. 7-9.

1987
A hot cell complex comes on-line at Pelindaba.
—"Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa," report of the Secretary General, U.N. Document A/42/649, 16 October 1987; cited in Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988 (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), p. 303.

1987
South Africa agrees to sell 2,000 tons of yellowcake to Romania, but then cancels the deal because Romania is not forthcoming with information about safeguard measures to be applied on the material.
—David Fischer, "South Africa: As a Nuclear Supplier," in W.C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenges of the Emerging Suppliers (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 275.

January 1987
France delivers a Thomson-CSF simulator to the Eskom to simulate that company's two Framatome/Alsthom units, as part of a turnkey contract.
—"KEPCO Order Boosts Thomson-CSF Hopes for More Simulator Exports," Nucleonics Week, 29 January 1987, pp. 9-10.

21 January 1987
The AEC issues a statement that it has promised the US government that it will observe the spirit and letter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and adhere to Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines in conducting its nuclear affairs. [Note: See 31 January 1984 entry.]
—David Fischer, "South Africa: As a Nuclear Supplier," in W.C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenges of the Emerging Suppliers (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 276.

March 1987
The US firm Edlow International receives a "large quantity of South African origin natural uranium," in spite of a letter dated February 1984 from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requesting that the company refrain from importing such material until the NRC completes its review of South African imports.
—Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Record of Meeting with Edlow International Company on South African Uranium Imports," memorandum to Harold R. Denton from James R. Shea, 12 May 1987.

26 May 1987
AEC Chairman John Marais announces that by 1988, South Africa's nuclear program will be virtually independent of overseas support. He states that the Koeberg nuclear power station will be utilizing locally enriched uranium. Safari-1 has been operating with locally manufactured fuel since 1981.
—Johannesburg Domestic Service, 26 May 1987; in "Nuclear Self-sufficiency Expected in 1988," Worldwide Report, 13 July 1987, p. 1.

August 1987
Armscor completes its "first qualified production model" nuclear weapon, which can be delivered by a modified Buccaneer bomber aircraft. By the program's termination, Armscor manufactures four additional deliverable devices as well as the HEU core and some non-nuclear components for a seventh bomb.
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 42.

August 1987
South Africa signs and ratifies two IAEA international nuclear safety agreements dealing with responses to nuclear accidents. The first is the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or the "Early Notice Convention," while the second is the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, or the "Assistance Convention."
—"IAEA Headed for September Vote on South African Suspension," Nucleonics Week, 27 August 1987, p. 5; IAEA Board of Governors General Conference, "Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Waste Safety," 11 August 2000, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/About/GC/GC44/Documents/
gc44inf10.pdf>.

21 September 1987
To thwart attempts by the Group of 77 to terminate South Africa's rights and privileges as a member of the IAEA, the United States and other states press President P.W. Botha to declare publicly that South Africa will soon accede to the NPT.
—David Fischer, Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects (New York: Routledge Publishing, 1992), pp. 214-215.

December 1987
South Africa plans to store low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and intermediate-level radioactive waste (ILW) from the Koeberg power station at the Vaalputs radioactive waste facility. Spent fuel from Koeberg will be stored in transportation casks, which "will probably be stored under cover at Vaalputs for several decades" before being shipped to France for reprocessing.
—"South Africa Stores Spent Fuel and Waste," Nuclear Engineering International, December 1987, p. 54.

1988-1990
Advena Central laboratories construction begins to maintain seven gun-type nuclear weapons. The decision to build more facilities is motivated by South Africa's long-term goal to replace the gun-type devices, and conduct nuclear weapons development work on advanced gun-type and implosion-type devices. The new Advena building contains enough space to load a warhead onto a ballistic missile, and the new storage vaults have space for one reentry body.
— David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir0594.html>.

1988
Research on implosion designs continues. In order to reduce the risk that accidental detonation of high explosives in an implosion device could lead to an unintended nuclear explosion, engineers at the Circle facility begin producing small amounts of TATB, an insensitive high explosive that ignites at a higher temperature than ordinary explosives.
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 11, <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir-594.html>.

1988
The Council for Nuclear Safety (CNS) becomes independent of its parent organization, the AEC, making the CNS responsible for licensing nuclear facilities and ensuring safe transportation of nuclear materials.
—Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, "South African Energy Policy Discussion Document," July 1995, <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/Green_papers/energy10.html>.

1988
The diminishing threat of the Soviet Union and the resolution of regional conflicts during the latter half of 1988 lead to an increased feeling of security by the South African government. A cease-fire between South Africa, Cuba, and Angola in August and the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by 1 September eventually leads to a tripartite agreement between these nations. The UN agreement is signed on 22 December and provides for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. The improvement of South Africa's security situation is reportedly a pivotal factor in the future decision to dismantle the nuclear weapons program.
—David Albright, "Nuclear Rollback: Understanding South Africa's Denuclearization Decision," in Barry R. Schneider and William L. Dowdy, Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), pp. 81-82.

June-October 1988
Armscor constructs a concrete floor and hangar around the surface of one of the test shafts in the Kalahari Desert, in order to assess the shaft's condition. The test site is examined in order to guarantee that a nuclear test can be conducted if needed, to fulfill phase three of the nuclear deterrent strategy. US and Soviet satellites detect the preparations. The discovery prompts both the United States and USSR to pressure the South African government to begin peace talks with Soviet-backed forces in the front-line states.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), pp. 13-16; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, 24 May 1993, p. 9.

August 1988
The Valindaba semi-commercial enrichment plant begins operation. It will supply both Koeberg reactors with fuel.
—Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), p. 277.

August 1988
The South African ministers of foreign affairs and of mineral and energy resources lead a delegation to IAEA headquarters in Vienna to discuss NPT accession with representatives from Britain, the United States, and the USSR.
—David Fischer, "South Africa: As a Nuclear Supplier," in W.C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenges of the Emerging Suppliers (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 279.

August 1988
Pik Botha, South African foreign minister, gives the clearest indication to date of South African capability to build nuclear weapons when he publicly announces, "We have the capability to make one [a nuclear bomb]. We have the capability to do so should we want to." When asked by reporters if South Africa already possesses such a device, he states, "I'm not going to enlarge on that statement."
—"Pretoria Says It Can Build A-Arms," New York Times, 14 August 1988.

16 September 1988
South Africa sends a letter to IAEA Director General Hans Blix expressing willingness to accede to the NPT if certain conditions are met, primarily that South Africa be allowed to market its uranium subject to IAEA safeguards.
—David Fischer, "South Africa: As a Nuclear Supplier," in W.C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenges of the Emerging Suppliers (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 279.

November 1988
Responding to pressure from the Japanese government and the United States, Japan's utility companies say they will not import any more uranium from South Africa, which had accounted for 11 percent of Japan's uranium imports.
—David E. Sanger, "Utilities in Japan to Shun Uranium from South Africa," New York Times, 12 November 1988, p. 1.

	Updated November 2003