There is no evidence to suggest that Tajikistan produces or possesses biological weapons. Tajikistan is a member of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), having ratified the convention on 27 June 2005.[2]

History
During Soviet times, Tajikistan worked under the USSR Ministry of Health in administering public health-related services and institutions, including the Anti-Plague (AP) system. Tajikistan’s one Regional AP Station opened in 1956 in Dushanbe, filling a dangerous gap in public health preparedness and epidemiology fields, since Tajikistan’s territory has 700 km² of natural plague foci.[3]  This station reported directly to the AP Institute, located in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Beginning in the 1960s, several AP Institutes around the Soviet Union, particularly those in Saratov, Rostov, and Volgograd, made research contributions to the USSR’s secret biological weapons program, under the auspices of Problem 5 and other programs. Problem 5 was a top-secret program that was managed by the N.F. Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology in Moscow. Its task was to work on the “the antibacterial protection of the population,”[4] specifically focusing on three main aspects.

The first aspect was to control highly dangerous endemic pathogens (other than plague) in the USSR. The second was to protect the USSR from exotic diseases. Third, Problem 5 worked to develop defensive measures to manage the consequences of a potential BW attack. This included research on BW detection and therapies. 

Despite the connection between some AP facilities and the Soviet BW program, there is no evidence that Tajikistan’s AP station, in particular, worked on any aspects of the Soviet biological weapons program. In fact, one Tajikistani AP scientist, when asked if he knew anything about Problem 5, replied, “What’s Problem 5?”[5]  Recent interviews with other AP scientists reveal that the Almaty AP Institute in Kazakhstan made defensive contributions to the BW program, but did not work knowingly on any offensive aspects of the program.[6] 

After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Tajikistan’s bio-medical infrastructure suffered major blows. Funding from Moscow was discontinued, as were collaborations with the AP network and other scientific institutes around the former Soviet Union.  Most scientists and trained personnel left Tajikistan for Russia and other republics, leaving both a funding and an expertise shortage.

During the Tajik civil war (1992-1997), researchers remaining at the Dushanbe AP station feared the implications of what could happen if the dangerous pathogens they worked with should be misused by the warring factions. For preventive purposes, the researchers decided to destroy the station’s culture collection, thus engaging in the only known instance of proactive proliferation prevention by an AP facility.[7]  Following the loss of their culture collection, the Dushanbe AP Station, worked exclusively on cholera.[8]

Status
Since Tajikistan is not known to possess or develop biological weapons, and is a member of the BWC, one remaining BW proliferation concern is the misuse of dual-use technology. This technology, as well as the knowledge and skills of those who apply it peacefully, could potentially be applied for weapons purposes. Internationally funded nonproliferation programs address this threat by attempting to keep scientists well-employed, and improving laboratory equipment. Biosafety and biosecurity are also important nonproliferation focus areas: biosafety prevents the accidental release of pathogens and biosecurity safeguards against their theft.

In addition to the Dushanbe AP station, other biological research centers in Tajikistan include the Central Asian Institute of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Republican Center for State Sanitary Epidemiological Control, State Unitary Institution Dezinfektsia, Tajik Research Institute of Preventive Medicine, Pavlovskiy Institute of Zoology and Parasitology, and Tajik Veterinary Research Institute. All these research centers are located in Dushanbe.

Tajikistan acceded to the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in 2003.[9]  With funding through this organization, the Dushanbe AP station is working on a new project to investigate the epizootological plague bacteria situation in Tajikistan.[10]

Other Tajikistani scientific institutions also receive funding through the ISTC.  The research that they are performing varies. For example, Dezinfektsia has proposed a study assessing rodent parasites and their effect on Tajikistan’s epidemiological situation. The project will include research on the pathogens causing tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and plague,[11] all of which are found on the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) list of select agents with biological weapons potential. Although Tajikistani scientists are working with dangerous pathogens, there is no reason to suspect that they would maliciously use these dual-use pathogens, especially considering the scientists’ excellent nonproliferation record, as demonstrated during the war. However, the poor conditions of the research facilities may unintentionally result in less than adequate biosafety and biosecurity procedures.

The other main concern regarding biological weapons nonproliferation in Tajikistan is border control. Border control problems are common in the Central Asian region. Weak border control increases the risk that Tajikistan’s territory could be used by outside parties as a transit route for weapons smuggling. As part of an initiative begun during Tajikistan’s civil war, Russian troops have assisted with border control since 1993, recently turning over monitoring to Tajik forces in September 2005.[12]

	Updated March 2007

Key Sources:
1.  CIA World Factbook, “Rank Order – GDP (purchasing power parity)” <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html> accessed 02 November 2006

2.  United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements” <http://disarmament.un.org/
TreatyStatus.nsf > accessed 02 November 2006

3. Alevtina Izvekova, “Issue Brief: International Assistance for Anti-plague Facilities in the Former Soviet Union to Prevent Proliferation of Biological Weapons” June 2005, <http://www.nti.org/
e_research/e3_65a.html> accessed 02 November 2006

4.  Igor V. Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine. New York: Promethieus Books, 2003.

5.  Center for Nonproliferation Studies Staff, Interview with Tajik AP scientist, 06 May 2003

6.  Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Anti-plague System and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program,” Critical Reviews of Microbiology, vol. 32, no. 1 (2006)

7.  Alevtina Izvekova, “Issue Brief: International Assistance for Anti-plague Facilities in the Former Soviet Union to Prevent Proliferation of Biological Weapons” June 2005, <http://www.nti.org/
e_research/e3_65a.html> accessed 02 November 2006

8.  Center for Nonproliferation Studies Staff, Interview with Tajik AP scientist, 06 May 2003

9.  United States Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Tajikistan - Fiscal Year 2004” Washington, DC: August 17, 2004 <http://www.state.gov/
p/eur/rls/fs/35988.htm> accessed 02 November 2006 

10.  International Science & Technology Center, “Projects by location” available at: <http://tech-db.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/
projects-all-by-location.htm?open&Action=
Expand&Num=7.2#7.2> accessed 02 November 2006

11.  Ibid.

12.  China View, “Russia transfers Afghan-Tajik border control to Tajikistan” 01 September 2005 available at:  <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2005-09/01/content_3430960.htm> accessed 02 November 2006