Location: Ulugbek, approximately 30km northeast of Tashkent
Subordination: Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan
Background: The Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) was founded in 1956 as part of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan.[1] The VVR-SM reactor began operating in September 1959, at a capacity of 2MW.[2] INP is often described as the largest facility of its kind in Central Asia and aims to become the primary nuclear research and isotope production facility for the region. INP has a staff of 220 people.[3]
Sources:
[1] US Department of Energy, Russia/NIS Nuclear Material Security Task Force, Improving Nuclear Materials Security at the Institute of Nuclear Physics--Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Washington, DC, June 1997), US Department of Energy Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/text/t-broch/t-uzb/t-uzb.htm.
[2] A. Rakhmanov et. al., "A Neutronic Feasibility Study for LEU Conversion of the WWR-SM Research Reactor in Uzbekistan," Paper presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998, Sao Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division Web Site, p. 2. http://www.td.anl.gov/.../ARakhmanov.pdf.
[3] L.E. Romesburg, Institute of Nuclear Physics, Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Washington, DC, June 1997), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/.../nibs051.htm.{Entered 2/26/01 KB}
Activities: The VVR-SM reactor is designed to carry out experiments in the field of nuclear physics and nuclear engineering, neutron activation analysis, solid state physics, and isotope production.[1] During the Soviet era, the reactor was also used for military scientific experiments.[2] In addition to the VVR-SM reactor, the institute includes two cyclotrons, a gamma source facility, a neutron generator, and a radiochemical complex. The facility engages in commercial production of radioactive isotopes, labeled compounds and isotope sources, super-pure metals, measurement and control instruments, and air and water purification filters.[3] The staff covers most of its operational expenses by selling commercial production to the US, Germany, India, NIS, and other countries. As of 1996, the government provided only 27% of the institute's budget.[4] The Institute conducts cooperative research under 22 programs with international research centers, including the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN), Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, and research centers in Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Poland, and other countries.[5]
Sources:
[1] A. Rakhmanov et. al., "A Neutronic Feasibility Study for LEU Conversion of the WWR-SM Research Reactor in Uzbekistan," Paper presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998, Sao Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division Web Site, http://www.td.anl.gov/.../ARakhmanov.pdf.
[2] NISNP discussion with Uzbekistani nuclear physicist, 2 June 1995.
[3] "The Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences," Cooperative Monitoring Center Web Site, http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Central/InstituteNucPhysics.htm.
[4] Emily Ewell, "Trip Report - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine," May 1996.{Updated 6/9/98 AM}
[5] "Institute of Nuclear Physics," Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan Web Site, http://www.uzsci.net/physmat/inf/index_in.html. {Updated 2/26/01 KB}
STRUCTURE:
The Institute of Nuclear Physics is made up of 26 scientific divisions and two enterprises, Tezlatgich and Radiopreparat, which produce and export isotopes.
["Institute of Nuclear Physics," Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences Web Site, http://www.uzsci.net/physmat/inf/index_in.html.]{Entered 3/12/01 KB}
MPC&A: Following a June 1995 inspection visit by IAEA officials, Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance in the areas of material control and accounting, while the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to provide physical protection upgrades. Work on physical protection upgrades began in September 1995 and was completed in August 1996.
To improve physical protection at INP, four main systems were installed: delay barriers, entry control systems, an alarm assessment system, and an enhanced communications system. A 10 meter-wide clear zone was established around the reactor complex. Windows at the ground level were permanently covered with security grills. At the lobby entrance in the main building, a grilled door was installed to control entry. Main doors to the lobby entrance, reactor control room, and the reactor building were equipped with magnetic card readers and keypads, magnetic door locks, balanced magnetic switches, and request-to-exit switches. The fresh fuel storage vault was reconfigured as a room-within-a-room, which requires two authorized personnel to be present with lock codes to open the magnetically locked door. At all critical areas within the facility, interior intrusion detection sensors were installed. Hand-held and walk-through special nuclear material (SNM) and metal detectors were installed in the main building entrance to detect unauthorized movement of radioactive materials.
In addition to sensor systems, video cameras and a video display system were installed. INP was provided with a Central Alarm Station (CAS) to monitor general area surveillance inputs. Several security modifications have been designed to reinforce the CAS against attempts at forced entry. CAS displays indicate the status of all sensors. To improve MC&A, a fresh fuel measurement system was provided. In addition, a personal computer-based material accounting system and accounting software have been installed at INP. Tamper indication devices (TID) were provided to prevent unauthorized access to storage containers. Wax seals were replaced with E-type seals.
Sources:
[1] US Department of Energy, Russia/NIS Nuclear Material Security Task Force, Improving Nuclear Materials Security at the Institute of Nuclear Physics--Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Washington, DC, June 1997), US Department of Energy Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/text/t-broch/t-uzb/t-uzb.htm. {Updated 6/9/98 AM}
[2] L.E. Romesburg, Institute of Nuclear Physics, Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Washington, DC, June 1997), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/.../nibs051.htm.{Updated 2/26/01 KB}
Reactors: One
Type: VVR-SM, tank
Power: 10MW
The VVR-SM reactor operated at 2MW from criticality in September 1959 until 1971. Since modernization, which took place in 1971-1979, the reactor has operated at 10MW.
[A. Rakhmanov et. al., "A Neutronic Feasibility Study for LEU Conversion of the WWR-SM Research Reactor in Uzbekistan," Paper presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998, Sao Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division Web Site, http://www.td.anl.gov/.../ARakhmanov.pdf.]{Updated 2/26/01 KB}
Fuel: The VVR-SM was converted from using 36% HEU fuel to using low enriched uranium fuel (likely 19.5 percent enrichment [4]), the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced on 19 March 2008. [1]
From 1959 to 1971 the reactor used pin-type fuel elements enriched to 10%. From 1971 to 1979, the reactor was modernized under a project developed by the Kurchatov Institute. From 1979 to August 1998, the reactor used IRT-2M type fuel assemblies with 90% HEU-based fuel. The reactor was converted to use 36% HEU under the Russian Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, a process lasting from August 1998 to February 1999.[2] The normal core loading was 5.5kg.[3] The last of the 90% HEU fuel was loaded into the reactor core in August 1998 and tests to further reduce the enrichment to 19.7% HEU were scheduled to take place in October 2000.[2] Burnup tests of four full-sized IRT-4M fuel assemblies with 19.5% enrichment were successfully completed to a burn up of approximately 60 percent in 2000-2002. [4]
In September of 2004, nearly 11 kilograms of Russian-origin enriched uranium fuel, including three kilograms of HEU, were repatriated to Russia to be downblended into low-enriched fuel suitable for use in nuclear power reactors.
According to a contract signed by Russian TVEL, the US Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Physics Institute of Uzbekistan, Russia would supplied the reactor with 21 fuel assemblies in December 2007. The 20% enriched uranium fuel, produced by the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant, was set to replace the highly enriched fuel used by the reactor.[5] The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced that the reactor was successfully converted as part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in March 2008.[1]
Sources:
[1]National Nuclear Security Administration, "Reactor converted in Uzbekistan," 19 March 2008, http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/1939.htm.
[2] E. P. Ryazantsev, et. al., "Testing of the IRT-4M Type FA with LEU UO2-Al Fuel in WWR-CM Reactor," Paper presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998, Sao Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division Web Site, http://www.td.anl.gov/.../PDF/Egor00.pdf{Updated 2/26/01, 5/8/2001 KB}
[3] International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Research Reactor Database, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb.
[4] A. Rakhmanov, B. Yuldashev, U. Salikhbaev, "Prospects of WWR-SM Reactor LEU Conversion and Spent Fuel Shipment Activity Status," paper presented at RERTR 26, 7-12 November, 2004, Vienna, Austria, http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR26/pdf/32-Rakhmanov.pdf.
[5] "Company News: TVEL to Supply Uzbekistan," Nuclear Engineering International, 2 August 2007; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://lexis-nexis.com.
Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste: On 19 April 2006, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced that it had completed the transfer of approximately 139 pounds of spent research reactor fuel from on-site cooling ponds to Russia. The transfer was made in four tranches at a cost of $11 million.[1] The Institute had accumulated spent fuel since 1993.[2]
Sources:
[1] C.J. Chivers, "Uzbeks Ship Bomb-Grade Waste to Russia," New York Times, 20 April 2006.
[2] Emily Ewell, "Trip Report - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine," May 1996.
3/31/2003: CARGO SEIZED AT AIRPORT
Kazakhstani authorities seized a cargo arriving in Almaty on 31 March 2003, after finding that it was emitting higher than normal radiation. The cargo was on a Uzbekistan Airways flight from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The firm Radiopreparat (at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Ulugbek, Uzbekistan) had manufactured the radioactive material, which was intended only for medical uses. The recipient of the cargo was Izotop, a private Kazakhstani firm that supplies radioactive sources for industrial and medical purposes. Authorities found that the cargo was emitting 100 microroentgen/hr at a distance of one meter and placed it in a warehouse under guard and video surveillance. There are no details indicating that the shipment was illegal or that the radioactive materials were improperly labeled or shielded.
[Igor Cherepanov, "V aeroportu Alma-Aty zaderzhan gruz s povyshennym radiatsionnym fonom," ITAR-TASS, 1 April 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 12/12/2003 CC}
1/16/2003: TRANSFER OF SPENT FUEL TO RUSSIA DELAYED; RUSSIA AFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR REPATRIATION
Under a March 2002 agreement between Uzbekistan, Russia and the United States, spent fuel from the INP reactor is to be transferred to Russia for technical storage and processing. US officials had hoped that the transfer would take place by the end of 2002, but as of January 2003, the material has yet to be removed.[1] In an article published in Vremya novostey on 16 January 2003, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev reaffirmed his support for the repatriation. He was quoted as saying, "this [spent fuel from Uzbekistan] is our fuel and we have to take it."[2]
Sources:
[1] Bryan Bender, "International Response: Moscow to Speed Up HEU Removal at Soviet-Era Research Reactors," Global Security Newswire, http://nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/1/3/5p.html, 3 January 2003.
[2]"Ministerstvo po atomnoy energii rassmatrivayet vopros o dostavke v Rossiyu otrabotannogo yadernogo topliva s issledovatelskogo reaktora v Uzbekistane," Vremya novostey, No. 6 (681), 16 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 1/16/2003 AD}
3/12/2002: SPENT FUEL TO BE SENT TO RUSSIA
On 12 March 2002, US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Uzbekistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulaziz Komilov signed an agreement under which spent fuel from the INP reactor will be repatriated to Russia.[1] According to a report in Vremya MN, 250 spent fuel assemblies weighing a total of 70kg have accumulated at the reactor site.[2] Under the agreement, the United States will pay all transportation costs, estimated at about $4 million, and Uzbekistan, with the assistance of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, will convert the reactor to use low-enriched uranium.[1,3]
Sources:
[1] "U.S. and Uzbekistan Cooperate on Nonproliferation: Agreement Protects Nuclear Materials and Technologies," US Department of Energy Press Release, 12 March 2002, DOE Web Site, http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases02/marpr/pr02040_v.htm.
[2] "Vremya politiki i ekonomiki. Uzbekistan," Vremya MN, No. 017, 31 January 2002, p. 3.{Updated 03/29/2002 YP}
[3] ITAR-TASS, 12 March 2002; in "US to pay for transportation of Uzkek enriched uranium to Russia," FBIS Document CEP200020313000036.{Entered 03/22/2002 YP}
9/98: VVR-SM REACTOR CONVERTED TO USE 36 PERCENT ENRICHED FUEL
In September 1998, a team from the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow arrived at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent to convert the VVR-SM reactor to use lower-enriched fuel. Previously, the reactor had used 90 percent enriched fuel, but after the conversion, it will use 36 percent enriched fuel. For a transitional period, the core will be loaded with a mixture of 90 percent and 36 percent fuel. As of February 1999, the reactor was running on such a mix of fuel, but the last of the institute's supply of 90 percent enriched fuel had been loaded into the reactor core in August 1998, meaning that the reactor will probably begin running solely on 36 percent fuel in the near future. According to Dr. Bekhzhad Yuldashev, the director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics, the institute decided to convert the reactor to run on lower-enriched fuel in order to conform with current tendencies in the international community. Dr. Yuldashev said the conversion required some adjustments to the reactor, but no major structural changes. He added that no outside financial assistance had been received for the conversion. The institute plans to convert the reactor again in the future to use 20 percent enriched fuel, although Dr. Yuldashev did not specify a date for this change. The institute now has a small stock of 36 percent enriched fuel on site, which it purchases from the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant.
[NISNP discussions with NISNP nuclear physicist, 2 February 1999, UZB990202.]{entered 4/6/99 SDP}
10/1/96: DOE COMPLETED UPGRADING OF VVR-SM REACTOR FACILITIES
The US Department of Energy (DOE) announced that it has completed MPC&A upgrades at the reactor facilities operated by the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Uzbekistani Academy of Sciences. US Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary commented that the upgrades "will significantly reduce the risk of theft of bomb-grade materials at the facilities." DOE's Sandia, Los Alamos, and Argonne National Laboratories participated in developing the safeguards. The United Kingdom has also contributed to improving the Uzbekistani facilities.
["DOE Secures Nuclear Material in Belarus and Uzbekistan, Reduces Risk of Nuclear Proliferation," DOE Press Release, 1 October 1996, http://www.doe.gov/.../pr96147.html.]
5/96: PHYSICAL PROTECTION IMPROVEMENTS AT THE VVR-SM REACTOR
According to the Tashkent Institute of Nuclear Physics and Uzbekistan's Gosgortekhnadzor, all physical protection improvements at the VVR-SM reactor in Ulugbek should be completed by September 1996. The work is mostly conducted under the US Department of Energy's Government-to-Government program. US assistance has been swiftly implemented in Uzbekistan--construction work started in 2/96, after talks on US physical protection assistance took place in 9/95. In addition, the United Kingdom is providing some communications equipment for the reactor's security guards. No international assistance has been earmarked for the second reactor at the Uzbekistani Radioelectrical Technical Plant, according to Gosgortekhnadzor.
[Emily Ewell, "Trip Report - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine," May 1996.]
3/96: SANDIA WORKS WITH THE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR PHYSICS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION
A joint project between Sandia National Laboratories and the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent is working to increase physical protection and technical support at the reactor site in order to comply with IAEA safeguards. In FY 1995, the project made recommendations on the development of safeguards and in FY 1996 the recommendations are to be enacted.
[Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Protection and Surveillance of Nuclear Materials in the Former Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 20 March 1996, pp. 27-28.]
8/95: INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS BUYS FUEL FROM GEORGIA
In August 1995, the Institute of Physics in Georgia sold 17 IRT-3M type assemblies to the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan.[1] The fuel assemblies, containing approximately 5kg of HEU, were sold to Uzbekistan for $20,000.[2,3]
Sources:
[1] Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk, Russia: March 1997), p. 4.
[2] Interfax, 12 January 1997; in "Foreign Ministry Makes A Statement On Nuclear Reactor," FBIS-SOV-97-008.
[3] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Thwarting U.S. Bid To Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5 January 1997, pp. A1, A4.{Updated 5/8/2001 KB}
6/95: MPC&A NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED
No changes have been made in the system of MPC&A at the Tashkent reactor since the Soviet period. One Uzbekistani official acknowledged that MPC&A needed to be improved, and added that Uzbekistan had asked the IAEA and donor countries for help in this sphere.
[NISNP interview with officials at the Uzbekistani State Committee for Safety and Supervision in Mining and Industry, June 1995.]
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