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Updated October 2006
Biological weapons (BW) are living microorganisms that cause fatal or incapacitating
diseases. This category of weapons also includes toxins,
non-living poisonous chemicals derived from bacteria, plants, or animals. It
is hard to determine the number of countries that have BW. Nations rarely acknowledge having such arms. Moreover, it is relatively easy to keep such programs secret.
Japan
had the largest
BW program of all nations that took part in World War II. Japan
began its program in 1932 and terminated it when it surrendered in 1945.
Great
Britain started an offensive BW program in the early 1940s. It began phasing
out the program in the early 1950s, when it developed nuclear weapons. By 1960,
the BW program was gone. The
United
States also began an offensive BW program during World War II, about
1943. President Richard Nixon announced that the United States was unilaterally
renouncing offensive BW in November 1969, and that ban was extended to toxins
in February 1970. The United States has continued research on defenses against
BW. France had an active BW research and development program in the late
1930s. That program was halted before the Germans captured France in 1940. France
did not restart its offensive program after World War II.
Germany had
a small BW research effort in the 1930s and early 1940s, but it was mainly defensive
in nature. Hitler actually forbade the German military from developing offensive
BW.
The Soviet Union/Russia Had BW and Cheated on an International
Arms Control Agreement. The Soviet Union started a BW program in 1928. Its
program was of moderate size during World War II and through the 1960s.
The Soviet Union continued an extensive BW program after it signed the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972. The accidental release of anthrax
from a biological weapons production facility in the Soviet city of
Sverdlovsk
in 1979 triggered a serious epidemic in the local population. The Soviet BW
program had its greatest growth about 1988. In 1992, Yeltsin acknowledged that
the Soviet Union had violated the BWC and gave orders to dismantle the program.
However, it is not known whether that order was carried out completely because
the Russian Ministry of Defense forbids foreigners from visiting three military
biological research institutes that are known to have played important roles
in the Soviet BW program. The United States government believes that "some
elements of [the] large FSU [former Soviet Union] biological warfare program
may remain intact and could support future agent production." (See
Proliferation
Threat and Response, p. 65.)
Iraq Had a Secret BW Program. After Iraq's defeat in
the 1991 Gulf War, UN inspectors discovered that Iraq had developed and stockpiled
several types of BW. These included bombs and missiles armed with warheads containing
pathogenic bacteria and powerful toxins. From 1991-1998, the UN
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspected and destroyed Iraq's BW development
and production facilities, achieving its most important results after the defection
of a high-level Iraqi official in 1995. In November 1998, however, Iraq expelled
the UN inspectors. UN Inspectors returned in November 2002, but were withdrawn
in March 2003 before a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq and toppled the
regime of Saddam Hussein. Released in September 2004, a
comprehensive report of the findings of the Iraq Survey Group
concludes that Iraq had no plans for a new BW program. The report
states that there was no evidence that Iraq has conducted any BW
work for military purposes since 1996 or that it had any interest in pursuing a BW
program.
Other Programs. Allegations have been made that
the following countries have BW-relevant programs:
China,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Syria, and
Israel.
Before December 2003, numerous sources alleged that
Libya, which had signed the
BWC in 1982, was pursuing an offensive BW capability. Libya did conduct BW
research and development, but because of its poor technological base, was
never able to weaponize BW. In December 2003, Libya renounced all of its
weapons of mass destruction programs in exchange for the lifting of
international economic sanctions. Subsequently, U.S. and British inspectors
found no evidence of an advanced BW program in Libya. In 2004, the United
States confirmed that Libya's WMD programs had been shutdown; it has helped
to redirect Libya's WMD scientists to civilian projects through the
Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund. On May 15, 2006, the United States restored
full diplomatic relations with Libya and lifted its designation
as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
Some countries may be pursuing BW programs under the guise of defensive research
and development activities. The BWC
allows work conducted for defensive purposes. Some defensive activities can,
however, be quickly transformed into offensive programs to develop and produce
BW. It is also possible that terrorists could seek to acquire BW. Terrorist
groups might do this on their own, or with the help of nations that have BW
programs.
For these reasons, the United States
and other countries pursue substantial biodefense
programs involving both military and civilian research facilities to counter
threats posed by foreign military BW programs and biological terrorism.
Allegations have been made that the United States is pursuing offensive BW
research under the guise of biodefense, but the U.S. government has denied these
allegations and claimed that all its BW research complies with all BWC
provisions.
Biological Weapons Rarely Used
During the 20th century, there was only one major case of widespread use of
BW. This was by Japan
after it invaded China in the late 1930s. In addition, the Japanese carried
out biological attacks against Chinese civilian populations during World War
II. The biological attacks caused thousands of deaths and illnesses. In addition,
Japanese military scientists carried out tests of biological agents on Chinese,
Russian, and, perhaps, English and American prisoners. On a smaller scale, in
1979, Bulgarian secret service agents attempted to assassinate two opponents
of the Bulgarian government using a toxin called ricin. One target was killed
and the other was hospitalized but survived. (The toxin was probably supplied
by the Soviet Union.) In the 1980s, agents from white-ruled South Africa are
believed to have used BW to assassinate political opponents. It is also alleged
that South African operatives started an epidemic of anthrax in Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe), during the Rhodesian civil war in the 1970s. Hearings of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission exposed many details
of South Africa's past BW program.
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Further Reading:
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CNS,
Chronology
of State Use and Biological and Chemical Weapons Control |
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Gert Harigel, "CBW:
Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment" |
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CNS,
Chemical
and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present |
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U.S. Department of Defense,
Proliferation
Threat and Response |
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The Nonproliferation Review,
"Biological
Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek" |
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NTI, Alevtina Izvekova,
"International Assistance for Anti-plague Facilities in the Former
Soviet Union to Prevent Proliferation of Biological Weapons" |
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PBS Frontline, Plague War,
Interviews
with Key Scientists and Government Officials on the Soviet's BW Program |
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CIA,
Report
to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction |
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Strategic Studies Institute, Milton
Leitenberg,
"Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat" |
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CNS,
Chemical
and Biological Weapons Resource Page |
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Special Advisor to the DCI,
Comprehensive Report on Iraq's WMD (Sept. 2004) |
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni and Andrew
Feickert,
"Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction" |
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CNS,
2002 WMD Chronology: Incidents
Involving Sub-national Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Materials |
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The Nonproliferation Review,
Chandre Gould & Peter Folb,
"The South African Chemical and
Biological Warfare Program: An Overview" |
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