Limiting Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles

In 1987, the United States and six other advanced Western democracies (the "Group of Seven" or "G-7") established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR attempts to slow the spread of missiles able to carry WMD. It is not a formal treaty nor binding agreement. Members of the regime agree to adopt the same export control rules. These rules limit the transfer of missiles able to carry 500 kilograms (1,100 pounds) a distance of 300 kilometers (190 miles) or more. The regime also restricts exports of technology and equipment for the production of such missiles. The regime covers both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Today, the MTCR has 34 members, as well as a number of countries (notably China) that agree to follow its guidelines, even though they are not formally members of the regime.

Although the MTCR has had important successes, it has not halted missile proliferation. Missile capabilities are growing for a number of reasons. North Korea, which is not a member of the MTCR, has exported missiles and missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Libya. In addition, China made a number of significant missile and missile technology exports during the 1990s, especially to Pakistan. However, in September 2003, China formally expressed an interest in becoming a member of the MTCR, and the second round of a series of negotiations to join concluded positively in June 2004.  

The United States believes that Russia continues to provide assistance to Iran's missile program. Russia is a member of the MTCR but denies making the exports. Finally, as scientific and technical knowledge spreads around the globe and countries have gained their own experience in developing missiles, the need for outside help tends to become less important. India, a country with a robust missile program, is a specific example of this general trend.

Limits of the MTCR. One shortcoming of the MTCR is that its export control policies are meant only as a means of restricting the supply of missile technology, not as a step towards the abolition of the missiles in national military forces. In fact, several MTCR members themselves possess large arsenals of sophisticated missiles. For this reason, critics of the MTCR contend that the group is discriminatory, separating the missile "haves" from the "have-nots." Indeed, the MTCR does not place any controls on countries seeking to acquire missile capabilities, unless they are new states seeking to become members of the MTCR. These countries must accept restrictions on their missile programs and missile-related exports. Finally, because the MTCR offers no financial incentives for accepting its guidelines, membership may be financially detrimental to countries that have invested in expensive missile development programs only to find themselves limited in their ability to export missile-related equipment and technology. 

International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Missile proliferation and the limited scope of the MTCR's aims, incentives, and membership caused the creation of the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in 2002 (now known as the "Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.") It is open for signature by all countries, whether MTCR members or not. One hundred and twenty-five countries have signed the Code by October 2006. The Code recognizes the threat presented by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and tries to reduce the demand for missiles worldwide. It encourages signatories to provide greater openness and restraint in their missile programs. Specifically, the Code calls upon signatories to exercise maximum restraint in the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles; to make annual declarations regarding ballistic missile programs; and to provide pre-launch notification before ballistic missile or space vehicle launches.

However, the code is only politically—but not legally—binding. Several observers have noted weaknesses in the Code's current provisions and continued lack of real incentives to join.  The weaknesses are a result of several factors. First, the provisions had to be agreeable to the MTCR members. Many of the original MTCR members (a group that includes France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom) would not sign a document that called for the reduction or elimination of their missile stockpiles. Second, the Code only requires states to exercise restraint regarding ballistic missile programs, and not space launch vehicles. It does not account for the interchangeable nature of most of the technology for ballistic missiles and peaceful space launch vehicles. Finally, several key states, such as North Korea, India, Pakistan, and China, have refused to sign the Code. Nonetheless, the Code has been hailed by some as a useful tool in the global nonproliferation regime, serving as an expression of the international norm against ballistic missile proliferation. (However, unlike the MTCR, which limits transfers of technology for both ballistic and cruise missiles, the Code does not cover cruise missiles or related technology.)

Missile Defenses: A New Priority. The Bush administration is actively pursuing research on ballistic missile defense. It hopes to deploy missiles able to shoot down in-coming enemy missiles launched by one of the hostile, emerging WMD states, i.e., Iran or North Korea. Although critics continue to question whether ballistic missile defenses will be effective against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a broad consensus has emerged in the United States supporting at least the limited deployment of ballistic missile defenses. The Bush administration announced plans to put a limited missile defense system in place by the end of September 2004, with interceptors deployed at bases in Alaska and California. In August 2005, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency announced a new series of tests for the U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. But in March 2006, the Government Accounting Office reported that the Missile Defense Agency had made only modest progress and systems intended to intercept missiles from North Korea and the Middle East failed to meet quality and performance standards. In September 2006, the U.S. Congress restricted funding for the space-based interceptor program and called for a comprehensive assessment of the foreign policy and national security implications of the program. Still, the Congress authorized 2007 funding for other missile defense programs.

Further Reading:

	Missile Technology Control Regime website
	Arms Control Association, Ballistic Missile Proliferation
	The Nonproliferation Review, Wyn Q. Bowen, "U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade (1987-1997)"
	Disarmament Diplomacy, Thomas Graham & Dinshaw Mistry, "Two Treaties to Contain Missile Proliferation"
	Arms Control Association, U.S. Missile Sanctions
	U.S. Department of State, Missile Defense and Deterrence
	Arms Control Today, Aaron Karp, "Going Ballistic? Reversing Missile Proliferation"
	Disarmament Diplomacy, Viacheslav Abrosimov, "Preventing Missile Proliferation: Incentives and Security Guarantees"
	CNS, Missile Technology Control Regime
	CNS, Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
	Arms Control Today, Mark Smith, "On Thin Ice: the First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct"
	CRS, Steven A. Hildreth, "Missile Defense: The Current Debate"
	NTI, WMD411, Ballistic Missile Defense
	U.S. Missile Defense Agency website
	Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nicole Evans, "Missile Defense: Winning Minds, Not Hearts"