A Primer on WMD

Definitions
Effects
Production
Proliferation & Use
Missiles
Terrorism
Historical Context and Scope of Threat
What Can Be Done?
Nuclear Terrorism
Bioterrorism
Curbing WMD Proliferation
 

Anthrax Attacks and Bioterrorism

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated November 2006

 

Further Reading:

FBI, Amerithrax

NTI, Jason Pate and Gary Ackerman, "Assessing the Threat of Mass-Casualty Bioterrorism"

Michael Barletta, Amy Sands, and Jonathan Tucker, "Keeping Track of Anthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Convention"

CNN, Anthrax Investigation

NTI, CNS, BW Terrorism Tutorial
UCLA, Dept. of Epidemiology,  American Anthrax Outbreak of 2001
Strategic Studies Institute, Milton Leitenberg, "Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat"
CRS, Michael Simpson, "Anthrax-Contaminated Facilities: Preparations and Standards for Remediation"

Once a largely theoretical threat, bioterrorism has become a reality since October 2001. Letters containing the deadly anthrax bacterium Bacillus anthracis were sent through the mail to prominent politicians and people in the media. Eleven people were diagnosed with inhalation anthrax, five of whom died. Another 14 people were diagnosed with the cutaneous, or skin, form of the disease; none of these persons died. The victims included postal workers and other individuals who came into direct contact with the letters as well as cases of cross-contamination. DNA analysis of the anthrax spores used in the letters narrowed the investigation down to the Ames vaccine strain, acquired in the early 1980s by Fort Detrick's Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the primary U.S. bioterrorism research facility. The Ames strain has been shared with about a dozen other labs in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain for research purposes.  Despite a massive investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and postal inspectors, no arrest has been made in the case dubbed "Amerithrax." The investigation has focused on 20-30 "persons of interest" within the United States who may have had access to and experience with anthrax, particularly scientists connected with Fort Detrick, Maryland.

Why are these attacks important?

The anthrax letters were an entirely new phenomenon. Despite hundreds of anthrax hoaxes prior to 2001, this was the first time that actual anthrax spores had been used in the United States. These anthrax incidents were small-scale, and apparently intended to frighten rather than kill large numbers of people. Since 2001, there have been many hoaxes, where the senders claim to be sending anthrax, but actually enclose a harmless white powder. In many cases, hazardous material teams respond to the hoaxes at great cost to the public and disruption to businesses. The U.S. government has allocated billions of dollars to detecting and combating anthrax and other biological weapons. The U.S. Postal Service has installed machines across the country that monitor the mail for anthrax or other biological agents. Some experts argue that the huge U.S. spending on bioterrorism is out of proportion to the threat.

The Perpetrators

As of November 2006, the identity of the perpetrator or perpetrators of the 2001 anthrax attacks remains unknown. The Federal Bureau of Investigations continues the Amerithrax investigation with 17 agents and 10 postal inspectors working on the case. The fact that the same strain of anthrax appears to have been used in all the attacks suggests that they all originated with the same individual, group, or organization. There has been a debate about how sophisticated the perpetrator had to be to produce the highly concentrated anthrax used in the attacks.  The FBI released a profile of the suspect in an effort to enlist public assistance in the investigation.

 

 

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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