Prohibitions on WMD Possession and Use

A series of multilateral treaties with wide membership restrict the possession and/or use of WMD. The most important are:

• the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare;
• the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that had not detonated a nuclear explosion before January 1, 1967;
• the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), prohibiting the development, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer of biological weapons (BW); and
• the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons (CW).

Many of these treaties are complemented by specialized multilateral or bilateral organizations, inspection systems, and export control arrangements. More broadly, the treaties grew out of and reinforced a nearly universal revulsion toward the use of WMD.

How Treaties Limit WMD

Ideally, a multilateral nonproliferation treaty would prohibit the manufacture, testing, or possession of WMD. It might also prohibit providing help to another country attempting to develop WMD. It would then provide for an inspection, or verification, system. This verification system would help confirm that the countries that have signed and ratified the treaty (its parties), are complying with the treaty, and are not cheating. The treaty might establish an international organization to conduct these inspections. That organization would also provide a forum to permit the parties to review and discuss the implementation of the treaty. The treaty would also restrict exports of materials, equipment, and know-how that might help a party or a non-party to develop the WMD in question. To encourage membership, however, parties in good standing would be granted greater access to the controlled dual-use materials and technologies for peaceful purposes.

In addition, an ideal nonproliferation treaty would describe how to punish countries that violate the treaty. That is, the treaty would have clear and effective compliance and enforcement provisions.

Finally, a treaty of this type should have provisions describing the following:

• when it becomes effective or enters into force (for example, after a certain group or number of countries have joined);
• its duration--whether it will last for a fixed amount of time or in perpetuity (forever);
• how it can be amended; and
• how a country can withdraw after joining (a step usually permitted after a declaration that its supreme national interests would be threatened if it remained in the treaty).

Unfortunately, few treaties live up to these ideals. The Geneva Protocol, for example, does not ban countries from possessing CW and BW, but only from using them. The NPT is not a universal ban on possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, it allows the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China to retain their nuclear arsenals because they had detonated nuclear devices before the treaty was negotiated. The BTWC bans possession of these weapons but contains no inspection arrangements. The CWC probably comes closest to the ideal, with strong provisions covering all of the points described above.

Implementation of a treaty can bring out new problems. The system of inspections developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement the NPT relied on parties declaring all of their nuclear activities. Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran cheated by keeping some of their nuclear facilities and activities secret. The IAEA has since strengthened its inspection system. There have also been problems in implementing the CWC. One difficulty is that parties have been reluctant to use the treaty's challenge inspection system because they fear that they will be targets of frivolous retaliatory inspections.

Impact of Multilateral WMD Treaties

The core multilateral nonproliferation treaties have created a net of restrictions on WMD possession and use. For members of the various treaties, the restrictions are binding, but even for non-members the regimes establish a norm of behavior that has a significant influence. In World War II, for example, the norm established against the use of chemical weapons, reinforced through the 1925 Geneva Protocol, is thought to have influenced the decisions of Germany, the United States, and other combatants not to employ these weapons.

The nuclear and chemical weapons inspections now covering a very large number of countries increase the effect of these treaties, and place significant constraints on countries seeking to develop these weapons in secret.

Nonetheless, critics complain that the inspection and verification systems used under the NPT and the CWC and the lack of verification provisions under the BTWC ultimately make these treaties unreliable. Coupled with the challenges of gaining compliance by states suspected of violations, as well as proliferators that remain outside the regimes, the critics argue that the treaties can never be a substitute for deterrence, defense, and related military measures.

Further Reading:

	U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments"
	CNS, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
	CNS, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Resources
	OPCW, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
	CTBTO, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
	CRS, Amy F. Woolf et al., "Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements"
	Arms Control Today, Jonathan B. Tucker, "Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements"
	WMD 411, "Eliminating Chemical Weapons: An Overview of the CWC"
	The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention web site
	WMD 411, The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
	WMD 411, Proliferation and Past Use of WMD