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Some inspectors in Slovakia.
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A series of
multilateral
treaties with wide membership restrict the possession and/or use of WMD.
The most important are:
- the 1925
Geneva Protocol, prohibiting
the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological
methods of warfare;
- the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that had not detonated
a nuclear explosion before January 1, 1967;
- the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC), prohibiting the development, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer
of biological weapons (BW); and
- the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical
weapons (CW).
Many of these treaties are complemented by specialized multilateral or
bilateral
organizations, inspection systems, and
export control
arrangements. More broadly, the treaties grew out of and reinforced a nearly
universal revulsion toward the use of WMD.
How Treaties Limit WMD
IAEA sign with ElBaradhei.
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Ideally, a multilateral nonproliferation treaty would prohibit the manufacture,
testing, or possession of WMD. It might also prohibit providing help to another
country attempting to develop WMD. It would then provide for an inspection,
or verification, system.
This verification system would help confirm that the countries that have signed
and ratified the treaty (its parties),
are complying with the treaty, and are not cheating. The treaty might establish an
international organization to conduct these inspections. That organization would
also provide a forum to permit the parties to review and discuss the implementation
of the treaty. The treaty would also restrict exports of materials, equipment,
and know-how that might help a party or a non-party
to develop the WMD in question. To encourage membership, however, parties in
good standing would be granted greater access to the controlled dual-use
materials and technologies for peaceful purposes.
In addition, an ideal nonproliferation treaty would describe how to punish
countries that violate the treaty. That is, the treaty would have clear and
effective compliance
and enforcement provisions.
Finally, a treaty of this type should have provisions describing the following:
- when it becomes effective or enters
into force (for example, after a certain group or number of countries
have joined);
- its duration--whether it will last for a fixed amount of time or in perpetuity
(forever);
- how it can be amended; and
- how a country can withdraw after joining (a step usually permitted after
a declaration that its supreme
national interests would be threatened if it remained in the treaty).
Unfortunately, few treaties live up to these ideals. The
Geneva
Protocol, for example, does not ban countries from possessing CW and BW, but only from using them. The
NPT
is not a universal ban on possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, it allows
the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China to retain their
nuclear arsenals because they had detonated nuclear devices before the treaty
was negotiated. The
BTWC bans possession of these
weapons but contains no inspection arrangements. The
CWC probably comes closest
to the ideal, with strong provisions covering all of the points described
above.
Implementation of a treaty can bring out new problems. The system of inspections
developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement the NPT relied on parties declaring all of their nuclear activities.
Iraq,
Libya,
North Korea,
and
Iran
cheated by keeping some of their nuclear facilities and activities secret. The IAEA has
since strengthened its inspection system. There have also been problems in
implementing the CWC. One difficulty is that parties have been reluctant to
use the treaty's challenge inspection system because they fear that they will
be targets of frivolous retaliatory inspections.
Impact of Multilateral WMD Treaties
The core multilateral nonproliferation treaties have created a net of restrictions
on WMD possession and use. For members of the various treaties, the restrictions
are binding, but even for non-members the regimes establish a norm of behavior
that has a significant influence. In World War II, for example, the norm established
against the use of chemical weapons, reinforced through the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, is thought to have influenced the decisions of Germany, the
United States, and other combatants not to employ these weapons.
The nuclear and chemical weapons inspections now covering a very large number
of countries increase the effect of these treaties, and place significant
constraints on countries seeking to develop these weapons in secret.
Nonetheless, critics complain that the inspection and verification systems
used under the
NPT and the
CWC
and the lack of verification provisions under the
BTWC
ultimately make these treaties unreliable. Coupled with the challenges of
gaining compliance by states suspected of violations, as well as proliferators
that remain outside the regimes, the critics argue that the treaties can never
be a substitute for
deterrence, defense,
and
related military measures.
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Further Reading:
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U.S. Department of State,
"Adherence
to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments" |
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CNS,
Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes |
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CNS,
Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Resources |
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OPCW,
Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons |
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CTBTO,
Preparatory Commission
for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty |
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CNS, Jonathan B. Tucker, Editor,
The
Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions |
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Arms Control Today, Jonathan B. Tucker,
"Verifying
the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements" |
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CNS,
"The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention:
Success or Failure?" |
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The Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention website |
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WMD 411,
The Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention |
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WMD 411,
Proliferation and Past Use of WMD |
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