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Updated January 2007
The United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) entered
into several bilateral
treaties and agreements limiting the size and configuration of their nuclear
forces, as well as banning certain nuclear tests and weapons systems. They have
also implemented a number of confidence-building
measures to reduce the threat of nuclear confrontation between them.
U.S. - Russian Bilateral Treaties and Agreements
1969-1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I): The Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) resulted in the signing in 1972 of the ABM
Treaty and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive
arms. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty): The
ABM Treaty, from which the United
States withdrew on June 13, 2002, limited the deployment of
anti-ballistic
missile systems. The treaty allowed deployments of up to two limited-area
defensive systems with up to 100 interceptor launchers each. One of these systems could defend the national capital, the other an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment site. ABM systems that could defend the
entire territory of either country (nationwide defense) were prohibited. In 1974
a protocol to the
ABM Treaty was signed limiting each side to only one limited-area defensive
system with up to 100 interceptors. The treaty restricted testing of anti-missile
systems and deployment of early-warning radars. It also banned mobile and space-based
ABM systems. In 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed recognizing Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as the successor states to the Soviet Union
and parties to the ABM Treaty. On June
13, 2002, the United States
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in order to pursue the
development of missile defenses that would have been banned by the agreement. See
WMD 411, Case Study:
Ballistic Missile Defense; the ABM-TMD Demarcation Agreements;
and the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1997 Agreed Statements on ABM-TMD Demarcation:
On September 26, 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding
was signed recognizing
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Ukraine as the successor states to the Soviet
Union and
parties to the
ABM Treaty. In addition, two Agreed
Statements were signed outlining limits on the testing of
theater
missile defense (TMD) systems. The Agreed
Statements, often referred to
as the TMD Demarcation
Agreement, outlined criteria that distinguished TMD
systems from strategic
BMD systems. Under the
agreement, the deployment of "lower-velocity" TMD
systems
(those with interceptor velocities of three
kilometers per second or lower)
were allowed, provided
that they were not tested against ballistic missile targets
having velocities above five kilometers per second or
ranges that exceeded 3,500 kilometers. The agreement
prohibited the five parties from testing "higher-velocity"
TMD systems (those with interceptor velocities above three
kilometers per second) against ballistic missile targets with
velocities above five kilometers per
second or ranges that
exceeded 3,500 kilometers. At the same time, the parties
made commitments regarding information exchanges and
confidence-building
measures. The Bush
Administration's announcement of the
United
States'
official withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty,
however, has made this agreement unnecessary, and its
ratification is
no longer being pursued. See the
Arms Control Association Fact Sheet; the
U.S. State Department Fact Sheet; and CNS, Carnegie,
Status
Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union, Chap. 2.
1972 SALT I Interim Agreement: The SALT I Interim
Agreement froze the numbers of ICBM launchers at 1972 levels: 1,054 for the
United States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. The agreement also set ceilings
on the number of submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and ballistic missile submarines. The
United States was permitted to reach a ceiling of 710 SLBM launchers on 44 ballistic
missile submarines from a base level of 656 SLBM launchers. The Soviet Union
was permitted to reach a ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers on 62 ballistic missile
submarines from a base level of 740 SLBM launchers. These additional launchers
were permitted only as replacement for older ICBM or SLBM launchers, which were
required to be dismantled or destroyed. The duration of the Interim Agreement
was five years. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty: This treaty prohibits
underground nuclear weapons tests with yields above 150 kilotons. Although
submitted to the U.S. Senate in 1976, this treaty did not enter into force until
1990, after additional verification
procedures had been agreed. See U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: The PNE
Treaty governs underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The
treaty did not enter into force until 1990. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II): The Salt II Treaty
was signed by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev on June 18, 1979. The terms of the treaty called for limiting the number
of delivery vehicles (launchers and bombers)
to 2,400 on each side, to be reduced to 2,250 by the end of 1981. The treaty
also set limits on the numbers of MIRVed
launchers. In early 1980, President Carter asked the Senate to delay consideration
of the treaty because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter,
and subsequently President Ronald Reagan, made statements committing the United
States to abide by the terms of the treaty even though it had not been ratified.
In 1986, President Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be
bound by the SALT II limits because of Soviet violations of its arms control
commitments. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF): The
INF Treaty required the United States and Soviet Union to eliminate intermediate-
and short-range nuclear missiles. The treaty covered all ground-based ballistic
and cruise missiles
with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It also banned testing and production
of these missiles. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Chemical Weapons: The
U.S.-Soviet Wyoming MOU on Chemical Weapons provided for a bilateral verification
experiment and an exchange of data on chemical weapons and production facilities.
See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA): The U.S.-Soviet
BDA called for the destruction of 35,000 metric tons of chemical weapons on
both sides. See the Federation
of American Scientists Fact Sheet.
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I): START
I, signed by the United States and Soviet Union, set a ceiling of 1,600 strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 accountable warheads for each country.
Through the Lisbon Protocol signed in 1992, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine,
and Russia became parties to START I as successor states to the Soviet Union.
See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II):
START II was a bilateral
treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation that was abandoned by both sides before
coming into force. The treaty
called for reductions in the number of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles (long-range ballistic
missiles and heavy
bombers) and the number of warheads deployed on them. By the end of 2001,
each party was to have reduced the total number of deployed strategic warheads to 3,500.
No more than 1,750 warheads were to be deployed on SLBMs.
MIRVed ICBMs were prohibited, but MIRVed SLBMs were allowed. The United States and Russia ratified
START II in 1996 and 2000, respectively, although Russia added conditions as
described below. In September 1997, the United States and Russia signed a protocol
to START II that extended the deadline for completing the START II reductions
from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007, and called for early deactivation
of systems scheduled for destruction under the treaty. The START II Treaty did not enter into force because the Russian ratification act made entry
into force conditional on U.S. Senate consent to ratification of the September 1997
protocol and approval of the Agreed Statements on ABM-TMD
Demarcation. Neither of
these occurred because of opposition to
the latter in the U.S. Senate, where a strong faction objected to any action
that might be seen as supporting the ABM Treaty. On June 14, 2002, one day after the U.S.
withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it would no longer consider
itself to be bound by START II provisions. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet and CNS, Carnegie, Status
Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former
Soviet Union, Chapter 2.
2000 Agreement Concerning the Management and
Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes
and Related Cooperation (Plutonium Disposition Agreement): On September 1,
2000, U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov
signed the
U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement. Under the agreement,
each country must dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium that have been withdrawn from a nuclear weapons program and designated
as no longer required for defense purposes. The agreement also obligates the
countries to declare the quantities, forms, and other information about the
disposition plutonium, and to cooperate in the management of their disposition
programs. Both countries must begin either immobilizing or burning as
mixed-oxide fuel the weapons-grade plutonium by 2007. See the
agreement text, and NTI's
"Russia: Plutonium Disposition Overview."
2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT): Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and U.S.
President George W. Bush signed this treaty, also referred to as the Treaty of
Moscow, on May 24, 2002. The approximately
475-word treaty states that both the United States and Russia will reduce their
numbers of operationally deployed
nuclear warheads to between 1,700-2,200 within the next 10 years. It establishes
a Bilateral Implementation Commission, scheduled to meet at least twice a year, to discuss and review the
treaty's
implementation. The treaty will remain in force until December 31, 2012, at which
time the parties have the option of extending or terminating the agreement.
Either party can withdraw from the treaty upon giving three months written
notice to the other. The document does not require the destruction of strategic
delivery systems, specify what is to be done with the warheads once they have
been removed from launchers, or constrain the development of ballistic missile
defenses. A Joint Statement, also
issued on May 24, 2002, establishes a Consultative Group for Strategic Security
to discuss confidence-building measures and transparency issues, as well as
other strategic issues of mutual interest. See the
treaty text, the
U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, and the
Joint Statement.
(Dates indicate date of signature.)
1963 Hot Line Agreement: The Hot Line Agreement established a direct
communications link between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet
Union to reduce the chances of a nuclear exchange stemming from an accident
or miscalculation. The agreement was adopted following the Cuban Missile Crisis
of October 1962 and has been modified to take note of advances in telecommunications
technology. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet. See also U.S. Department of State Fact Sheets
on the Expansion
Agreement and Modernization
Agreement.
1971 Accidents Measures Agreement: The Accidents Measures Agreement
requires each party to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launches
if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction
of the other party. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement: The Incidents at Sea Agreement provides
for advance notice of actions on the high seas that represent a hazard to navigation
or aircraft in flight. Planned ballistic missile launches that will take place
in international waters represent such a hazard, and, under the Incidents at
Sea Agreement, notification must be provided. Notices to pilots and mariners
consist of warnings that announce "closure areas" at sea or in the
air; these notices need not identify the nature of the hazard. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1973 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement: Under the Prevention of Nuclear
War Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to make the removal
of the danger of nuclear war and the non-use of nuclear weapons an "objective
of their policies," to practice restraint in their relations toward each
other and toward all countries, and to pursue a policy dedicated toward stability
and peace. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1987 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) Agreement: The NRRC Agreement
called for each party to establish a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in its capital
and to establish a special facsimile communications link between these Centers.
These NRRC became operational on April 1, 1988. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification: The Ballistic Missile Launch
Notification Agreement provides for notification, no less than 24 hours in advance,
of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any test launch of
an ICBM or SLBM.
The agreement also provides that these notifications be provided through the
NRRC. See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Reduction Initiatives: On September 27, 1991,
U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced a series of unilateral measures that reduced
the alert level of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and started the removal of
tactical nuclear
weapons from U.S. ground forces and from all naval vessels except strategic
missile submarines (SSBNs). Nine days later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
announced a similar set of unilateral measures that were subsequently confirmed
and expanded by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in January 1992. Combined, the
Soviet/Russian measures would eliminate warheads for tactical land-based missiles,
artillery shells, and mines; eliminate one-half of the warheads for anti-ballistic
and anti-aircraft missiles; remove all substrategic nuclear weapons from naval
vessels; partially eliminate warheads from naval aircraft; and cut the number
of warheads for tactical aircraft in half. However, the United States is
concerned that Russia has not fully implemented these understandings. See Acronym Institute, U.S.
Deterrence Posture and Requirements: Congressional Testimony and CNS, Carnegie,
Status
Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former
Soviet Union.
1994 Mutual Detargeting: Under this arrangement,
the United States and Russia agreed to no longer target their ICBMs
and SLBMs at each other.
However, the missiles can be retargeted on short notice, in seconds or minutes.
See the Federation
of American Scientists Fact Sheet.
1998 Joint Data Exchange Center Memorandum of Understanding (JDEC MOU):
The JDEC MOU calls for the creation in Moscow of a joint center for the
exchange of data from early warning systems and notifications of missile launches.
See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
2000 Notification of Missile Launches Memorandum of Understanding (PLNS
MOU): This MOU calls for a Pre- and Post-Launch Notification System (PLNS)
for launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The MOU provides
for the voluntary notification of satellites forced from orbit and certain space
experiments that could adversely affect the operation of early warning radars.
See the U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet.
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Further Reading:
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U.S. Department of State,
Treaties and Agreements |
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U.S. Department of State,
"Adherence to
and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments" |
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CRS, Amy Woolf,
"Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S. Russian Agenda" |
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WMD 411,
START
& SORT Case Study |
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Arms Control Today, Nikolai Sokov,
"The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT" |
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Federation of American Scientists,
Arms
Control Agreements |
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Arms Control Association,
Treaties |
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CNS and Carnegie Endowment,
Status
Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former
Soviet Union |
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