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Deterrence
means trying to stop a potential enemy from attacking by threatening to
retaliate. In theory, by building a nuclear weapons arsenal (or developing
other weapons of mass destruction), a state prevents a perceived enemy from
attacking it. An enemy would judge that the cost of an attack, particularly
nuclear retaliation, would be
greater than the potential gains.
Since the Soviet Union (now, Russia) and China acquired nuclear weapons in
1949 and 1964, respectively, the United States has relied on deterrence to discourage
these countries from using nuclear weapons against it. The United States
renewed its commitment to deterrence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff draft
"Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" (March 2005)and the
"National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
(February 2006). The Soviet Union (and
Russia) and China have adopted this deterrence strategy against each other and against
the United States, as have all other nuclear states with respect to their nuclear
adversaries. In the area of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), the best-known
example of mutual deterrence
occurred during World War II, when it appears that the threat of retaliatory
use of CBW by the Allies dissuaded Germany from using these armaments. Other
factors also played a role, however, such as the legal prohibition on CBW use
enshrined in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the
lack of military planning for CBW operations.
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Further Reading:
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Robert S. McNamara,
Mutual Deterrence |
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Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
"National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
(2/13/06) |
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CATO Institute, Jeffrey
Record,
"Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation" |
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Arms Control Today,
Hans Kristensen,
"The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons" |
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U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations |
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RAND, Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman,
"Regional
Deterrence: The Nuclear Dimension" |
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National Academy Press,
Post-Cold
War Conflict Deterrence |
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Baker Spring,
Implications of the Nuclear Posture Review for Extended Deterrence |
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