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The
limitation of ballistic missile defenses systems
that can shoot down incoming, offensive missiles was considered to be an important
foundation for U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control agreements until the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). These limits were contained
in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Without such limits, it was argued, the United States and the Soviet Union might have deployed
ever-increasing numbers of offensive missiles to overcome each other's defenses.
Critics of the ABM Treaty pointed out that despite the mutual acceptance of this
pact, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an unrestricted nuclear
arms race during the 1970s that led to their acquisition of very large nuclear
arsenals, each numbering tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. There was considerable disagreement among U.S. political leaders and experts,
as well as among U.S. allies, as to whether the ABM Treaty, which restricted
the deployment of missile defenses against emerging WMD missile threats from
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, was
in fact a cornerstone of strategic stability or a relic of the Cold War that
interfered with the ability of the United States to defend itself against new
missile threats.
In December 2001, the Bush Administration announced its intention to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months (as permitted under
Article XV of the Treaty) in order to pursue the development of missile defenses
that would have been banned by the agreement.
Russia, whose nuclear arsenal would be
sufficiently large to overwhelm the modest missile defenses currently
contemplated by the Bush administration, reacted cautiously to the announcement. However, the subsequent
June 13, 2002 official U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty occurred with
little of the
international condemnation predicted by many analysts. It appears that this
step by the United States will not seriously injure U.S.-Russian relations or
the prospects for significant nuclear weapon reductions by the two countries. Indeed, on
May 24, 2002, five months after the United States announced its intention to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the United States and Russia signed a new arms
control agreement, the SORT treaty.
Will Deterrence Keep Working?
Closely related to the issue of missile defenses is an on-going debate over
whether deterrence will continue to work as it has in the past. Some argue
that today's erratic and unstable leaders in Iran, Libya, and North
Korea would be prepared to use WMD against the United States and its allies
even if it meant that their own countries might be destroyed by a retaliatory
attack. Others point out that deterrence has worked against other leaders
who showed little regard for the well-being of their citizens, such as Josef
Stalin.
Some analysts have argued that the spread of WMD reduces the likelihood of
WMD use. But the widespread adherence to treaties banning WMD and the considerable
effort made by the United States and other concerned states to slow the spread
of WMD to additional countries indicate that this view is not widely held
by policymakers.
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Further Reading:
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WMD 411 Bibliography, Deterrence
and Counterproliferation |
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WMD 411 Bibliography, Missile
Defense |
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Edward Warner III, "Nuclear Deterrence Force Still Essential" |
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NIPP, Keith Payne,
"Why We Must Sustain Nuclear Deterrence: Why Nuclear Weapons are Critical for U.S. Security" |
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Henry L. Stimson
Center, Jesse James and Matt Martin,
"Beyond Deterrence" |
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Joseph Rotblat, "Pugwash
and the Nuclear Issue" |
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Lawrence Freedman, "Does
Deterrence Have a Future?" |
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Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A
Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995) |
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