A Primer on WMD

Limiting Use of WMD
Reducing Tensions
Prohibitions
Diplomacy
Export Controls
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Deterrence
Counterproliferation
Detection
Preventive Actions
Preemptive Actions
Passive Defenses
Active Defenses
Emergency Preparedness
 

Preventive Actions

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

(updated August 15, 2003)

Interdiction and the Proliferation Security Initiative

One way to limit the use of WMD is to attempt to disrupt a state's WMD programs before the state can implement them. This can be done by using naval, ground, or sea forces to "interdict," or stop and seize ships, planes, or trucks suspected of carrying WMD or related technology in or out of a target country. A country following a strategy of interdiction would stop any shipment traveling to a country of proliferation risk if it determined that a shipment was carrying WMD or related technology. Also, the interdicting country could stop any shipments believed to be containing WMD from a target country for sale abroad. An interdicting country could also stop shipments of internationally banned substances, such as narcotics or counterfeit money, which the target country could use to fund its WMD programs. For interdiction to be possible, accurate intelligence on shipments of WMD and related technologies is required.

A recent example of this strategy occurred in December 2002. The United States had acquired information that a North Korean ship was transporting ballistic missiles to a state in the Middle East. The United States notified Spain, whose ships were operating in the Indian Ocean as part of the global war on terror. A Spanish warship stopped the North Korean freighter in the Indian Ocean, and U.S. and Spanish forces searched the vessel, discovering it was indeed carrying 15 North Korean ballistic missiles to Yemen. After the search, the United States and Spain allowed the ship to continue to its destination. There are two main reasons why the ship was allowed to continue. First, the United States and Spain determined that Yemen, which is a key ally in the war on terror, did not pose a serious threat to the United States nor its allies. Second, under current international law, no state has the right to stop a ship in international waters and confiscate its cargo unless that ship is engaged in illegal activities. (Examples of illegal activities are drug trafficking and piracy.) Although North Korea's sale of ballistic missiles may be potentially dangerous to the United States and its allies, it is a legal transaction under international law.

This incident was part of the intensification of U.S. efforts at interdiction, which later became a formal arrangement called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is an international effort to interrupt transfers of WMD or missiles on the seas, in the air, and on land. The United States, Spain, Poland, Great Britain, Portugal, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, and Australia are cooperating in the effort.  These 11 countries are trying to find ways to apply, or in some cases to change, international law. This would allow members to intercept WMD or missile transfers in international waters or international airspace. Members might even take action in the territorial waters or airspace of a target country. They will also share intelligence on suspected transfers of WMD or related technologies. With this intelligence, member states might act together or individually to interdict shipments.

Although this strategy does not pose as direct a military threat  as bombing or commando raids in efforts to disrupt WMD programs in a target country, the PSI does present certain risks. Target countries might determine that interception of their shipments in international or territorial waters or airspace is a blockade, which is an act of war. This could lead to retaliation by the target state.

Limited Military Attack

Another way to prevent the use of WMD is to use direct military force to disrupt a state's WMD programs before it can produce the weapons. Bombing or commando raids can be used to destroy WMD facilities while they are under construction. For example, Israel attempted to block Iraq's nuclear weapons program in 1981 by bombing a reactor in Iraq. It believed that Iraq was going to use the reactor to produce plutonium for nuclear arms.

Preventive actions such as these are dangerous because they are acts of war. Today, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea all possess WMD that they could use to retaliate if one of their WMD facilities were attacked. These states could direct their retaliation against the United States or a U.S. ally. (Although Libya does not possess long-range missiles, it could perhaps retaliate through an act of terrorism involving WMD.) When Israel attacked Iraq in 1981, Iraq did not have missiles nor warplanes that could reach Israel, reducing the danger of retaliation.

Preventive actions are also becoming more difficult to execute because countries developing WMD are hiding their activities more effectively than ever before. They are also protecting their WMD facilities against attack by building them deep underground, making them harder to destroy.

Preventive War

In peacetime, one strategy now receiving increased attention in the United States is to engage in a preventive war with a state believed to possess or to be developing WMD. The goal is to not only eliminate any WMD within the country, but to remove the hostile regime and replace it with a more moderate government that will be less likely to pursue WMD.

The March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein is a clear example of preventive war aimed at removing the regime from a country and dismantling its WMD programs. The United States had tried to compel Saddam Hussein for over a decade to eliminate the Iraqi WMD programs, but Western intelligence suggested that he had consistently refused to do so. In March 2003, after months of debate both domestically and in the UN Security Council, President George W. Bush concluded that renewed arms inspections in Iraq would not be effective in disarming Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration decided that only "regime change" could effectively eliminate the Iraqi WMD programs.

As a result, the United States led an international coalition to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration cited the action as enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which threatened Iraq with "serious consequences" if it failed to verifiably dismantle its WMD programs. The UN had not, however, adopted a new resolution that would have specifically authorized such use of military force. The United States hopes that it will have enough direct influence over the post-war government that eventually takes power in Iraq to ensure that it does not develop WMD.

Proponents of the concept of preventive war claim that the strategy brings two benefits. First, it eliminates the WMD program in the target country. Second, it will lead other states to realize that developing WMD programs might invite a similar attack form the United States upon themselves. This will, therefore, dissuade them from developing such weapons.

Opponents note that preventive war may produce the exact opposite result, and that the states might decide that WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, are necessary to deter the United States from attacking. It is unclear what effect the war against Iraq has had on WMD programs in North Korea or Iran, but some argue that both countries have accelerated their nuclear weapons programs as a result of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

The use of military force to deal with WMD threats has so far not been widely employed. U.S. government officials, however, insist that all options, including military action, are "on the table." Nonetheless, important differences exist between the Iraq example and that of North Korea or Iran. The United States had claimed its actions in Iraq were an enforcement of Resolution 1441. No comparable resolutions require Iran or North Korea to disarm or to submit to weapons inspections. The United States would, therefore, find it difficult to cite international law to justify military actions against those countries.

 

Further Reading:

David Albright and Khidhir Hamza,
"Iraq's Reconstitution of Its Nuclear Weapons Program"

U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Proliferation Threat and Response 2001"

WMD 411: Policy Options: Iran

WMD 411: Policy Options: North Korea

The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

Joseph Cirincione, "Can Preventive War Cure Proliferation?"

American Enterprise Institute, "The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine"


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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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