Take U.S. and Russian missiles off high alert in peacetime by removing their warheads and placing them in storage near the silos housing the missiles.

De-alerting would not require changes in the overall configuration of U.S. or Russian nuclear forces.

Bombers could remain on relatively high alert in the event of a crisis.

Both sides agreed to remove the warheads from some of their missiles, before those missiles were dismantled, in conjunction with the START II Treaty. Although START II never entered into force, the approach could be adapted to the SORT treaty, if each side agreed to remove the bulk of warheads from deployed strategic systems early in the ten-year treaty period.  SORT will use START I verification methods, with some modifications, to confirm the removal of warheads from operationally deployed strategic systems.

Opponents Say: Missiles Should Remain in Their Current State of Readiness.

De-alerting missiles may be unacceptable to Russia, because it would increase Russia's dependence on its decaying and vulnerable strategic bomber fleet.

De-alerting may be unacceptable to the United States if it requires the removal of all warheads from strategic submarines. De-alerting may be unacceptable to Russia if only land-based systems are covered, given the ability of U.S. submarine-based missiles to destroy de-alerted Russia land-based missiles in a first strike.

The SORT understanding covers only a portion of U.S. and Russian missiles; neither side has agreed to deactivate/de-alert all of its missiles.

De-alerting may be impractical because in a crisis both sides would rush to re-activate their missiles, and the side that rearmed its missiles first would have a tremendous advantage over the other. The faster side might even threaten the slower side with attack if it did not stop its re-activation efforts.