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SORT Verification Issues.
Although SORT has already entered into force, many observers have
noted that the implementation of the treaty will likely pose certain
challenges. These challenges include agreeing to a
definition of "strategic nuclear warheads" and determining what
verification mechanisms are available to the two parties. The SORT
treaty does not include any new or independent verification measures;
rather, it relies upon the verification protocols of the START I
treaty, which is officially observed as still binding between the
two parties. Critics note that one of the biggest drawbacks to SORT’s reliance upon START I for verification is that the later will
expire in 2009, while SORT doesn’t expire until 2012. That means
that unless START I is extended or a new treaty that adequately
addresses the need for verification is signed by 2009, there will be
a three-year gap when implementation of SORT will be
unverifiable.
START I Verification Measures.
The
Joint Statement between Russia and the United
States, states that START I provisions "will provide the foundation
for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in
further strategic offensive reductions, along with other
supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be
agreed."
START I verification measures allow each country
to utilize any accessible "national
technical means" of
verification, and provide for inspections at declared or
suspect facilities in order to authenticate each country's
declarations of its weapons and facilities. START I also requires
several other types of
confidence-building measures, including notification to
the other side of weapons testing and open displays of some types of
missile launchers. However, as with all previous treaties, the
facility and limited delivery vehicle inspections provided for in
START I do not include actual warhead inspections, allowing each
country to protect the secrecy of its classified warhead designs.
Proponents Say No Additional
Verification is Needed.
Through START I's
re-entry vehicle on-site
inspections clause,
both sides are permitted to observe the number of warheads on
selected
strategic systems. This provision should enable them to
confirm statements that warheads
have been removed from their delivery vehicles under SORT.
Although START I expires in 2009 and
SORT will continue until 2012, proponents argue that there will be
ample time to extend START I's verification provisions or to make
other arrangements to permit confirmation that Russia and the United
States are complying with SORT. Likewise,
the decision of each party to enter
into SORT and to limit their nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads
each was based upon each country's own assessment of its strategic
needs, not on how many operationally deployed warheads the other
side retains at any given time. Therefore, it may not be necessary
to negotiate additional ways to ensure compliance with a provision
that is meant to enhance each country's own
interests.
Parties to SORT could also verify implementation
by voluntarily providing
additional transparency measures as their warheads are being
separated from their launch-vehicles to confirm that they are being
removed from operational status, and where possible, that those
warheads are being dismantled and destroyed.
The lack of enhanced verification
procedures allows for greater flexibility in the implementation of
the treaty and reduces the future potential for conflict over treaty
compliance. After all, proponents argue, SORT and the Joint
Declaration are recognized by both Russia and the United
States as symbols that the antagonistic relationship between the two
sides that existed during the Cold War is over.
Opponents Say Stronger
Verification is Required.
While START I's re-entry vehicle
clause allows for inspections of deployed
launch vehicles, it does not provide any method to verify the status
of non-deployed warheads, which could plausibly be kept nearby for
swift redeployment. The START I provision also includes inspection
limits of two inspections per year at any one facility, with a total
of 10 re-entry vehicle inspections permitted per year.
Because
SORT does not dictate a progressive timetable for warhead reduction,
the last three years might prove to be a critical time period in
which many—or even most—of the Russian and U.S. warheads are
removed. However, if no verification protocols specifically tailored
to the implementation of SORT are agreed upon by that time, there
would be a three-year gap during which compliance with the treaty
could not be confirmed.
Although
SORT was negotiated and signed in an atmosphere of good relations
between the United States and Russia, the international security
environment comes with no guarantees for the future. Agreeing upon
further verification protocols will only enhance and support the
continuance of the good faith upon which the treaty is based.
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