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While
SORT requires that the
United States and Russia reduce the numbers of their strategic
offensive operationally deployed nuclear warheads, the treaty does
not specify what is to be done after the warheads are removed from
their missile delivery systems. The United States has plans to
voluntarily dismantle some of its removed warheads, but has also
announced that many of the warheads will be placed in storage.
Russia has not publicly stated that it will dismantle its removed
warheads, but is considered to lack the funds necessary to keep all
of its warheads in storage.
Proponents Say Removal
is Sufficient. Neither
START I nor the unimplemented START II required the dismantlement of removed
warheads. SORT should be no different, as all of these treaties are
aimed at reducing deployed nuclear forces.
While Russia has reduced its warhead
production capabilities, it continues to maintain its nuclear
arsenals by replacing aged and potentially unstable warheads with
newly produced ones. The United States temporarily ceased production
of its nuclear warhead "pits" in 1989; the Department of Energy
restarted small-scale warhead pit production at Los Alamos
Laboratory in New Mexico and produced it first pit in 2003. In the case that
reliability or safety issue is discovered in the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, or if there is a drastic, unforeseen change in the global
security environment, warheads once removed may again be necessary
for redeployment. Therefore, it made sense for the United States to
sign and ratify SORT because of the lack of a provision calling for
warhead dismantlement. Likewise, Russia signed on to SORT because it
was in the process of reducing its nuclear forces anyways; SORT
permitted at least some codified assurance that the United States
would take reciprocal measures.
The actual
dismantlement process for nuclear warheads requires extensive
personnel training, warhead evaluation, and facility preparation.
Specifying warhead dismantlement in the treaty could place an
undue burden on the NNSA,
the
U.S. agency
responsible for the evaluation, upkeep, and dismantlement of
warheads in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Because these responsibilities
directly affect national security, the decision of storage versus
dismantlement should be left to the discretion of the president.
Opponents Say Warheads Must Be
Dismantled. Although
neither START I nor the unimplemented START II required the
dismantlement of warheads, they did require the destruction of
launchers and delivery platforms. This requirement ensured that even
if removed warheads were simply placed in storage, they could not
easily be redeployed on a delivery vehicle. Because SORT includes no
such provision, dismantlement of the actual warhead should be
required.
Furthermore,
simply storing the removed warheads underscores the value that the
United States and Russia place on nuclear weapons and may encourage
other countries to acquire nuclear arms and to build nuclear
arsenals. Codifying the dismantlement of even a minimal number of
warheads could help to demonstrate U.S. and Russian compliance with
Article VI of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (which requires
all states to negotiate in good faith a treaty toward nuclear
disarmament).
With the
exception of its December 31, 2012 expiration date, the treaty does
not specify any period during or after its 10-year term in which
the number of each country's strategic offensive deployed warheads
cannot exceed the 2,200 limit. This allows each country the right to redeploy any and all removed warheads the day after the treaty
expires. Requiring at least some of the warheads to be dismantled
could help to prevent such a situation.
Russia's
weapons storage facilities are often poorly protected and already in
great disrepair. Increasing the number of stored warheads in these
facilities will only increase the chances of warhead theft by
terrorists.
The
United States,
on the other hand, already has large quantities of nuclear weapons
in reserve that can be used to replace warheads deemed unsafe or
unreliable. If the goal of SORT is truly to reduce the amount of
excess warheads, those that are not considered necessary for
stockpile replacement should be dismantled.
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Further Reading:
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U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld,
"Testimony Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee" |
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CRS, Amy Woolf,
"Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" |
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Arms Control Association,
Background Information on New
Strategic Nuclear Reductions Treaty |
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Center for Defense
Information,
"Likely Nuclear Arsenals Under
SORT" |
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SIPRI,
"Russian Nuclear Forces, 2006" |
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CRS, Amy Woolf,
"U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues" |
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