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The 2001 NPR has
transformed the traditional nuclear triad of missiles, bombers, and
submarines into a New Triad. The New Triad consists of three
"legs," where nuclear missiles, bombers, and submarines
now constitute
just one component of the first leg. Advanced conventional munitions
form the second component. The following section
describes in more depth each of the legs of the New Triad.
The First Leg: Non-Nuclear Weapons. The 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review theoretically enables the United States to depend less
on its nuclear forces by introducing an
assortment of diverse conventional capabilities to augment U.S.
deterrence. The 2001 NPR
aims to reduces the role of nuclear weapons in conflicts; but it
also increases the role of new conventional weapons. For example,
the New Triad includes conventional
precision-guided munitions (PGM)
to expand the president's options in a crisis. PGMs take "dumb"
conventional warheads and couple them with delivery platforms
(missiles) equipped with a combination of advanced navigational
features that significantly improves the accuracy of the weapon. A highly capable and robust PGM force
could prevent
a situation where the United States' non-nuclear weapons options have
been exhausted and the use of nuclear weapons is imminent. In theory, the
president would be able to employ non-nuclear PGMs
to strike the enemy's weapons and forces, a role previously reserved for nuclear weapons.
The Second Leg: Active and Passive Defense Mechanisms. The
2001 NPR incorporates both active and passive defense measures. Active
defense refers to systems like ballistic missile
defense (BMD), and passive defense refers to civil defense
measures. Essentially, the United States, in the post-September 11
security environment, believes that traditional nuclear deterrence
is no longer sufficient to
address the threat posed by state and non-state actors armed with
WMD and ballistic missiles.
The fears of increased
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by various state and
non-state actors are the primary drivers for deploying a national BMD
system. This system is envisioned as a complement to U.S. deterrence
because it is hoped that adversaries armed with ballistic missiles,
possibly carrying WMD, would be dissuaded from launching an attack
if they knew that there was a possibility their missiles would not
reach their targets.
The
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) governs active defenses. Once
under the supervision of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agency (BMDO),
the MDA
is now a
full-fledged agency, signifying the importance of BMD as a national
security measure.
The Third Leg: Responsive Defense Infrastructure. From
the Cold War years, the United States inherited a
large and cumbersome military complex designed to meet the threat
posed by a peer competitor; the Soviet Union. The 2001 NPR recognizes the
limitations of operating within the confines of a defense system
inhibited by slow procurement mechanisms and an over-reliance on
out-dated "legacy" systems (such as main battle tanks, heavy
bombers, and air-to-air combat fighters). Thus, the United States
has sought to develop a defense infrastructure better able to meet
the needs of a more amorphous security environment.
This architecture, as outlined in the NPR, needs to incorporate
flexibility and a robust investment in new technologies. It also
seeks to streamline the procurement process for weapons as new
technologies are introduced. The early deployment of a national BMD
system without testing, however, reflects one of the tensions
inherent in building a new defense infrastructure. It is possible
that the rapid deployment of new systems may undermine pre-existing
testing requirements. The premature use of the Global Hawk unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) in the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is
another example of how military commanders have exhibited a
willingness to test new weapons-systems on the battlefield through
trial-and-error instead of relying on conventional testing
protocols.
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Further Reading:
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Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insights,
"A Quiet Revolution: The New Nuclear Triad" |
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BASIC, Mark Bromley,
"'Planning
to Be Surprised': The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and its Implications
for Arms Control" |
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Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Kurt Guthe,
"The Nuclear Posture Review: How is the 'New Triad' New?" |
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DOD,
J.D. Crouch,
"Challenges of a New Capabilities-Based Defense Strategy: 'Transforming
U.S. Strategic Forces" |
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Disarmament Diplomacy, Jack
Mendelsohn,
"The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review" |
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CRS, Amy Woolf,
"U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure" |
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Arms Control Today, Hans
Kristensen,
"The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush
Pledge" |
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CDI,
Nuclear Weapon Database: United States Arsenal |
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U.S. Department of Defense,
"Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" (2005) |
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