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Background. Historically, the deployment of missile defenses has been
limited because of political, economic, and technological constraints. One primary concern
has been that if the United States employed defenses of this kind,
it could upset the strategic nuclear balance with Russia and, more recently, China. The reason
for this concern is that all three powers, the United States, Russia, and China
(as well as France and Britain),
possess nuclear-tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of missile defenses, these
missiles are capable of striking each other's territories on short notice.
During the Cold War, this "balance of terror" was thought by many to provide
stability and security in the form of deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence, in this sense, allowed the United States and the Soviet
Union to feel confident that they
would not be attacked because each state had the ability to retaliate and cause
unacceptable damage to the attacker. If the attacker had missile defenses,
however, it was argued, the attacker might be able to strike first and then
block a retaliatory strike. A state in possession of effective missile defenses,
conceivably, could intimidate other nuclear countries because of this
first-strike advantage. Therefore, many believe that missile defenses undermine
deterrence, and create strategic instability.
Current Status. Ballistic missile defense (BMD)
remains one of the most controversial issues in world politics and U.S. defense
policy. Nevertheless, in December 2002, six months after the United States
formally withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Bush administration announced
that the United States would deploy a limited missile defense system in Ft. Greely, Alaska, by the close of 2004. Subsequently,
a small site at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California was added. This
initial deployment, while limited in scope, offers the promise of some
protection from missiles launched from states across the Pacific Ocean, namely North
Korea and, possibly, China. However, at present, key technologies are still
missing from the system.
Advocates of BMD contend the United States is facing a growing number
of threats from ballistic
missiles and therefore must develop defenses
to combat those threats. Others, however, argue that there are other alternatives
for dealing with missile threats and that BMD has a number of inherent disadvantages. Russia and China
have specific concerns over BMD, as do many U.S. allies.
Proponents Claim that U.S. BMD is Essential for Security in the
Twenty-First Century. Those in favor of U.S. missile defenses argue that
such defenses are essential for U.S. national security. They believe that if
there were a conflict with Iran or North Korea, the threat of U.S. nuclear
retaliation might not deter the leaders in those countries from
attacking the United States with missiles carrying WMD. With missile defenses,
however, the United States could protect itself from WMD missile attacks, giving
it the freedom to respond militarily in reprisal to an attack without fear of retaliation
from adversaries. Those in favor of missile defenses also argue that if a state
knew that it would confront a U.S. missile shield, it might be discouraged from
developing long-range missiles in the first place.
In addition, supporters argue that the relatively small size of proposed BMD systems
will not affect Russia's large nuclear forces. Proponents acknowledge
that U.S. BMD might be able to defeat China's much smaller nuclear force;
however, they point out that China is already in the process of modernizing and
enlarging its nuclear arsenal. This fact could enable Beijing to overcome U.S.
defenses, and thereby maintain a credible nuclear deterrent against the United
States.
Opponents Claim that the Proposed U.S. BMD System Won't Work. Critics
of U.S. missile defenses question whether missile defenses will even
work. Tests of components of the system have failed on several occasions, even
though the tests were conducted under highly scripted
conditions where the trajectory and signature of incoming dummy warheads were
known ahead of time. Moreover, under realistic conditions, missile defenses
potentially could be defeated by relatively simple countermeasures.
Opponents also point out that missile
defenses are not necessary to improve U.S. security because deterrence has
worked in the past. Deterrence, they argue, worked against the Soviet Union
when it was ruled by tyrannical and "irrational" leaders like Josef Stalin, and
it worked against Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War. In that conflict, it is
possible that fear of U.S. nuclear retaliation kept Iraq from using biological
or chemical weapons against coalition forces.
Critics also contend that missile defenses would not help defend against a WMD attack that did not use missiles. An enemy could, for example, bring a
nuclear weapon into a U.S. port concealed in a ship, or smuggle biological
agents into the United States and disperse them secretly. Lastly, opponents
argue that besides undermining U.S.-Russian arms control agreements,
U.S. BMD could lead China to expand its nuclear forces beyond current
modernization efforts, leading to a nuclear arms race in Asia.
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Further Reading:
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CRS, Andrew Feickert,
"Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries" |
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Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Joseph Cirincione,
"The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat, 2005" |
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NTI, Nathan Voegelli,
"A Look
at Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System" |
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CRS, Steven Hildreth,
"Missile
Defense: The Current Debate" |
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Missile Defense Agency |
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CNS Inventory,
ABM Treaty |
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U.S. State Department,
Missile Defense Fact Sheets |
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CDI, "Missile Defense" |
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Fed. of American Scientists,
Ballistic Missile Defense |
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Anti-Missile Systems |
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Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,
Missile Defense |
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Arms Control Association,
"The
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty" |
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Federation of American Scientists,
"Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty" |
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U.S. Dept. of Defense,
Missile
Defense |
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CNS, Clay Moltz,
"New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security" |
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