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Critics of missile defenses to protect the United States question whether
missile defense technology will actually work. They believe that simple countermeasures,
such as the use of radar-reflecting metal chaff (small bits of metal), balloon
decoys, or dummy warheads, incorporated into missile warheads could defeat defenses aimed against long-range
missiles during their midcourse
or
terminal phases
(the times after the launch of a missile when it is flying through space or
when the warhead has separated from the missile body and is reentering the
atmosphere). The critics also argue that defenses will not work in the
boost phase, while a missile is still burning its propellant to generate
thrust, because defensive systems may not be able to get close enough or fire quickly enough
to hit the target missile during its first few minutes of flight.
Critics also point to the high costs of missile defenses. Since the 1950s,
the United States has spent approximately $148 billion on just the research
and development of various missile defense systems. According to some
estimates,
a layered BMD system capable
of protecting all 50 states with both ground- and space-based interceptors
could cost between $100 billion and $1 trillion by the year 2030.
Critics of BMD argue further that missile defenses would not help defend
against a rogue country WMD
attack that did not use ballistic missiles. They argue that a rogue state could, for
example, bring a nuclear weapon into a U.S. port on board a ship and then
detonate it, or smuggle biological warfare (BW) agents into the United States
and disperse them secretly. Such covert means of delivery would be
preferable to using missiles because a ballistic missile has a "return address," that
is, the United States could determine the country that had launched it and
then retaliate. If the country secretly brought WMD into the United States and
used them, however, it might be able to disguise its involvement and avoid
retribution.
Moreover, critics of missile defenses argue that no BMD system, no matter
how comprehensive, can guarantee total security against a ballistic missile
attack. Since no defensive system could provide total protection, and even
a single nuclear strike on a U.S. city would constitute "unacceptable damage,"
the United States would be deterred by nuclear rogue states even if it did
possess a national missile defense system.
Potential Effects on the Global Strategic Balance. The development of defenses against longer-range missiles is highly controversial.
The main reason is that if the Unites States develops defenses of this kind,
it could upset the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, and
between the United States and China. Today, each of these countries is
confident
that it could survive a U.S. nuclear first strike and still be able to retaliate
against the United States with its own nuclear-armed missiles, and that the
United States could do the same. The existence of this "second-strike capability"
provides security to all three countries. It allows each to feel confident
that it will not be attacked because it has the ability to retaliate and cause
unacceptable damage to the attacker. If one country had missile defenses,
however, it might be able to strike
first and then block a retaliatory strike.
This capability, even if it was never used, could allow the possessor to intimidate
other major nuclear countries. Russia may also be concerned that a U.S. BMD system may prompt
China to expand its own strategic nuclear force, making China more of a threat
to Russia.
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Further Reading:
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Nautilus Insitute, Lt. General Robert Gard & John Isaacs, "The Illusion of Operational Readiness of National Missile Defense" |
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Technology Review, Theodore
Postol,
"Why Missile Defense Won't Work" |
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Arms Control Association,
"U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance" |
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Union of Concerned Scientists,
"Missile Defense" |
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Union of Concerned Scientists,
"Technical Realities: An Analysis of the 2004 Deployment of a U.S. National Missile Defense System" |
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Arms Control Association,
Missile Defense Resources |
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Arms Control Today, Philip Coyle,
"Is Missile Defense on Target?" |
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Government Accountability Office, "Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but Program is Short of Metting Goals" (March 2008) |
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NTI, Nathan Voegelli,
"A Look
at Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System" |
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