Iran - Option 2: Work within the Current Nonproliferation Regime

Proponents Say: Encourage Iran to Accept Strengthened Safeguards, and Tighten Export Control Systems.

• The United States and Iran are both parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States believes that Iran possesses chemical weapons (CW) that it has not declared as required by the CWC. Under that treaty, the United States can demand the international inspectorate to conduct a challenge inspection at sites where Iran is thought to be producing and storing CW. The United States should demand a challenge inspection and use the requirements of the CWC to force Iran to eliminate any CW that is uncovered.
• The United States also believes that Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons. Although the United States cannot demand a challenge inspection under the NPT, it can supply information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and encourage that organization to request an inspection at the locations where Iran is suspected of pursuing nuclear arms. The United States should provide information to the IAEA and press it to expose Iran's nuclear weapons program. Rather than adopt an adversarial stance towards Iran, the United States should encourage Iran to conclude and bring into force the Additional Protocol. This would give the IAEA the authority to conduct more extensive inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. Such inspections could limit Iran's ability to operate a secret nuclear weapons program.
• The United States also believes that Russia is supplying technology to Iran for the production of missiles and nuclear weapons material. The United States should use sanctions and incentives to persuade Russia to stop these activities. (See discussion under WMD 411, Policy Options: The United States and Russia.)

Opponents Say: Utilizing Treaty Enforcement Mechanisms Could Backfire on the United States, and Export Control Systems Have Not Been Effective

• If the United States demands a challenge inspection against Iran under the CWC, Iran would likely retaliate by demanding an inspection in the United States. The United States has an extensive chemical defense program to develop technology for detecting CW use and for protecting against it. Iran's inspections might lead to the disclosure of these important U.S. capabilities and make it easier for Iran or other countries to defeat them in the future.
• If Iran demanded a challenge inspection against a U.S. site, the reputation of the United States as a champion of nonproliferation could be damaged. If Iran charged that a major U.S. chemical plant, for example a pesticide factory, was producing materials for CW, the allegation might be hard to disprove. It could require the United States to demonstrate that the entire output of the plant at issue had been used for legitimate purposes. The United States could be placed on the defensive for months or years, and might never clear its name.
• If the United States requested a challenge inspection in Iran under the CWC, or if it wanted the IAEA to conduct an inspection under the NPT, it would have to disclose detailed evidence about where in Iran it wanted the inspection done and why. The United States often obtains information through espionage and secret technical means such as spy satellites. If the United States were to reveal what it knows, Iran might be able to figure out how the United States obtained the information. The resulting insights might allow Iran to take steps to block future U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts.
• Once Iran learns that the United States is seeking a challenge inspection, it may have enough time to clean up any incriminating activities. When the inspectors arrive, they would find nothing, and it would appear that the United States had made a false accusation against Iran.
• Taking strong measures against Russia to persuade it to halt sensitive exports to Iran might involve a freeze on some U.S. programs in Russia that serve important U.S. national security goals. (See discussion under WMD 411, Policy Options: The United States and Russia.)
• Concerning Iran's nuclear weapons development, despite international efforts to prevent transfers of nuclear technology to Iran, the country has made significant progress in constructing a uranium enrichment program, based on a pilot facility at Natanz. If expanded, this facility could allow Iran to develop the highly enriched uranium needed to produce several nuclear weapons. In addition, Iran has also managed to import the material, equipment, and expertise necessary to construct a heavy water facility at Arak. The production of heavy water is an important step in the production of plutonium, which can also be used for nuclear weapons. Heavy water cannot, however, be used at nuclear power plants such as that at Bushehr, and Iran has not declared any facilities capable of using heavy water to the IAEA. This would suggest that Iran has constructed secret nuclear facilities that may be part of a nuclear weapons program. Therefore, not only is the location of every nuclear facility in Iran unknown, but the IAEA would not be able to conduct extensive inspections at those sites anyway, since Iran has not signed the Additional Protocol.

Further Reading:

	U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation Threat and Response (page 46 on the screen)
	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
	CITS, Alexander Pikayev, "Strategic Dimensions of the Russo-Iranian Partnership"
	CNS, Jean du Preez and Lawrence Scheinman, "Iran Rebuked for Failing to Comply with IAEA Safeguards"

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