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Unlike Russia, China has only a very small number of nuclear-armed missiles
that can reach the United States today. Current estimates are that China deploys
about 18 intercontinental
ballistic missiless (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States. China's
ICBMs are mostly old, antiquated land-based and liquid-fueled systems, which
are highly vulnerable to a first strike. For China, a limited U.S. missile
defense system could potentially negate China's ability to retaliate effectively
against a U.S. nuclear attack. This problem is particularly acute for China
because it has a no-first-use
(NFU) policy. As a result, China will likely respond to U.S. missile defense
plans by expanding the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal, at
a time when the United States is trying to reduce its own arsenal and that
of Russia.
China is especially sensitive about this issue because of the possibility
of a conflict involving the United States over the issue of Taiwan. China
claims that Taiwan is part of China's sovereign territory. Beijing prefers
peaceful reunification but for decades has refused to renounce the use of
force against Taiwan if it declares independence. Thus, Chinese leaders often
state they are committed to eventual reunification by any means necessary.
The United States takes no position on the legal status of Taiwan and since
the 1970s has supported a "peaceful resolution" (which does not necessarily
mean reunification) of the Taiwan issue. Yet, under the 1979 Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA), the United States regards threats against Taiwan as a matter of
"grave concern" and is committed to supply Taiwan with "defensive weapons."
The United States is committed to the defense of Taiwan under the TRA, but
the United States has never specified the precise conditions under which it
would aid Taiwan during a conflict or the scope of that assistance, which
might range from increased arms sales or full U.S. military intervention.
This policy is intended both to deter China from attacking Taiwan and to deter
Taiwan from declaring independence with the expectation that the United States
would come to its defense.
If a conflict over Taiwan erupted and U.S. forces intervened in the fighting,
there is a limited possibility the situation could escalate to the use or
threatened use of nuclear weapons. Chinese analysts claim that no Chinese
leader could remain in power if he "lost" Taiwan. Given massive U.S. conventional
superiority over Chinese forces, China might threaten the U.S. with the use
of nuclear weapons if it risked defeat during a conflict and faced the prospect
of losing Taiwan permanently. Unofficial statements by Chinese military officials
and civilian analysts suggest that Chinese strategists have considered such
possibilities. This is a worst-case assessment, however, and it is not likely
that the United States or China would allow the conflict to escalate to that
level.
Many Chinese believe that as long as China can threaten the United States
with nuclear weapons, the United States would be cautious in escalating its
involvement in the defense of Taiwan during a conflict. In essence, Chinese
strategists believe that the United States would not be prepared to risk being
attacked with nuclear weapons by China in order to protect Taiwan's independence.
Chinese strategists and officials fear, however, that U.S. deployment of defenses
against ICBMs could make China vulnerable to nuclear blackmail for the first
time since the 1950s and 1960s. China appeared to accept calmly the December
3, 2001, decision of the United States that it would withdraw from the ABM
Treaty in six months.
China is also concerned that the United States might supply Taiwan with defenses to counter
short-range missile threats. Although China could easily overwhelm these defenses by launching large numbers of offensive missiles, Beijing worries
that such U.S. transfers of defensive missiles would bolster independence advocates in Taiwan
and possibly enhance military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.
China has long opposed any and all U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for these reasons.
As a result of these considerations, Chinese concerns about U.S. missile
defense programs have become one of the most contentious issues in U.S. —
Chinese relations.
Proponents
of U.S. missile defense argue that Chinese nuclear force modernization is
inevitable and that U.S. missile defenses will have no unique impact on China.
The United States currently estimates that China will build an arsenal of
between 100 and 200 nuclear missiles able to reach the United States.
But critics
of missile defense believe that a U.S. BMD system would lead China to build
greater numbers of advanced long-range nuclear missiles, possibly with multiple
warhead technology, than it would otherwise. China will also likely respond
by developing countermeasures and decoy technologies. Critics also contend
that many in China also view U.S. BMD as a sign of increasingly hostile U.S.
intentions toward China and as part of an effort to contain China's legitimate
role in world affairs.
BMD and South Asia. If the United States deploys a BMD, China could
deploy more offensive missiles
and increase its total number of nuclear warheads. These actions could in
turn trigger a nuclear arms race in Asia. India considers China as a potential
enemy. If China enlarges its nuclear arsenal, India might respond by enlarging
its own nuclear forces. Pakistan considers India to be an adversary. If India's
nuclear forces were enlarged, Pakistan would feel compelled to further expand
its own nuclear arsenal.
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Further Reading:
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CNS, Stanley Foundation, Evan Medeiros, Rapporteur, Ballistic
Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing,
and Tokyo |
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WMD 411, Policy Options: The United States
and China |
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WMD 411, Policy Options: India
and Pakistan |
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National Intelligence Estimate, "Foreign
Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015" |
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CNS, Mountbatten Centre, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu,
"The
Implications
for Postures and Capabilities in South Asia" |
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IPCS, Chintamani Mahapatra, "Concerns
over American NMD" |
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Indian Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) |
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