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 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT
obligates countries that sign
and ratify the treaty "not
to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."
Background. The 1963 Partial
Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and
in outer space. This treaty did not prohibit underground nuclear testing,
however. The CTBT bans nuclear tests in all environments, including underground.
Historically, the nuclear powers have relied heavily on nuclear
testing to confirm the reliability and effectiveness of their nuclear
arsenals and to develop new types of nuclear weapons. For decades, countries
seeking to limit nuclear weapons have demanded a CTBT in the belief that such
a treaty would limit the ability of the nuclear states to develop more powerful
nuclear weapons and new types of nuclear arms. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru originally proposed a CTBT in 1954, but negotiations on the ban became
feasible only after the end of the Cold War.
Countries concerned about nuclear proliferation,
including the United States, supported a CTBT as a means of slowing the spread
of nuclear arms to additional countries. They argued that although a country
seeking to develop nuclear weapons might not need to conduct a test to build
a simple fission (or atomic)
bomb, such tests would be necessary if it sought to develop more complex and
powerful thermonuclear (or hydrogen)
bombs. Testing would also be necessary for a new nuclear country to develop
small warheads for ballistic
missiles.
At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the member-states agreed to extend the
NPT permanently but also endorsed a set of Principles and Objectives. One
of these principles called for a CTBT to be negotiated and opened for signature
by 1996. (Negotiations on the CTBT had already begun at the
nuclear-weapon
states was a key factor in gaining the support of the non-nuclear
weapon states for permanent extension of the NPT.
The 1996 deadline for negotiating the CTBT was met, but only after heated
debate on a number of issues. These issues included the question of whether
the treaty should allow very small (low-threshold) nuclear tests or should
ban all nuclear tests. A complete ban was agreed on. A second issue
was whether the treaty should allow an exception for
entry
into force — whether the treaty should become legally binding after
a certain number of states had ratified it or whether ratification by specific
states would be required. The negotiators chose the second option. Another
obstacle to concluding the treaty was an Indian initiative calling on the
nuclear weapon states to undertake a formal commitment to nuclear disarmament
within a certain period of time. This condition was based on India's view
that the CTBT as drafted was insufficient to achieve real progress in nuclear
disarmament. Failing to gain support for its proposal, India blocked the consensus
needed to move the treaty from the CD to the UN General Assembly. An Australian
initiative overcame the Indian opposition and led to a resolution endorsing
the treaty at a special session of the General Assembly. On September 24,
1996, the CTBT was opened for signature.
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Further Reading:
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PBS Frontline, Owen Cote, Jr., "A
Primer on Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Design" |
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FAS, Carey Sublette, Nuclear
Weapons Frequently Asked Questions |
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IEER, Fissile
Material Basics |
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FAS, Special
Weapons Primer, Nuclear Weapons |
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U.S. Dept. of Defense, Nuclear
Weapons Technology |
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Carnegie Endowment, Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, eds., "Nuclear
Weapons: A Primer," Tracking Nuclear Proliferation |
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BASIC,
The
NPT Review and Extension Conference |
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Carnegie Endowment, Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, eds., "The
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference," Tracking Nuclear Proliferation |
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WMD 411 Bibliography, Nuclear
Weapons, Multilateral
Organizations and International Nonproliferation Treaties |
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