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India's and Pakistan's Nuclear Relationship.
Neither India nor Pakistan is believed to have currently deployed nuclear
warheads mated with their delivery vehicles (missiles). However, little open-source information
is available about the operational nuclear status of either country. While both
countries regularly test nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and have in the
past conducted nuclear tests, neither country is believed to have nuclear
missiles targeted at each other.
Early-Warning Systems. India in 1999 took steps to develop and
deploy early-warning radars and communication devices that would give New Delhi
advance notice of a Pakistani nuclear attack. Pakistan has also expressed
interest in building similar early-warning devices. By providing assurance
against a surprise attack, such systems may also reinforce strategic stability
in the region. Many believe that the United States should
provide
unclassified assistance on nuclear weapon safety, security, and on
nuclear use doctrine
to both countries. However, other
experts believe that encouraging
a nuclear deterrence strategy approach is undesirable because it
may give the impression that the United States endorses the expansion of India's
and Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities. In 2004, the U.S. approved some
funds to the Department of Defense to pursue
nuclear
threat reduction programs in India and Pakistan similar to those
implemented in the former Soviet Union through the
Cooperative
Threat Reduction initiative.
India's Nuclear Doctrine. In August 1999, India released a
"Draft
Nuclear Doctrine" that called for a nuclear policy based on a minimum credible
deterrent. To India, a minimum deterrent means having nuclear forces that will
only be used in retaliation if India is attacked first by another state with
nuclear weapons. This posture is intended, in the long run, to be based on a
nuclear triad, similar to what the United States and the Soviet Union deployed
during the Cold War. This nuclear triad would consist of long-range bombers,
land-based ballistic missiles, and submarines. The "Draft Nuclear Doctrine" also contains
a
no
first use (NFU) provision. The purpose of the triad is to ensure that India
maintains a survivable second-strike force.
In January 2003, India created a
Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), which met for the first time in
September 2003. The NCA has taken steps to operationalize India's
nuclear capability as an integrated component of Indian national
security. Drawing upon the "Draft Nuclear Doctrine" and confirming its main
tenets, India published its official nuclear doctrine on January 4,
2003. In May 2004, India released the "Maritime Doctrine," which calls
for the deployment of 24 ballistic missile submarines by 2030.
India's official nuclear doctrine also calls for increased command
and control structures, and mentions the need to build survivable
nuclear forces; however, India, at present, does not have the
technical or logistical infrastructure to implement these changes.
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine. Publicly,
Pakistan's Prime Minister has stated that minimum deterrence is the
cornerstone of Pakistan's security policy, but Pakistan is not known
to employ a formal nuclear doctrine. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine
appears to be largely reactive to India's nuclear policies, and
Islamabad uses much of the same language in declaratory policy
that India does. Pakistan
probably feels compelled to compete in the nuclear area with India given Pakistan's
inferior conventional weapons force. By mimicking Indian policy, Pakistan
can be relatively certain of enforcing a stable nuclear
deterrent relationship.
Pakistan's nuclear weapons are apparently controlled, like India's, by
a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). Created in February 2000, the NCA comprises
President Musharraf, several cabinet ministers, and the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee. The NCA reportedly oversees nuclear doctrine, as well
as nuclear research and development, command and control during wartime and
advice to the president about the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan does not adhere to a
no first use (NFU) policy. |
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Further Reading:
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni,
"Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons" |
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South Asia Institute, Mohammad B.
Alam,
"India's Nuclear Doctrine: Context and Constraints" |
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The Nonproliferation Review, Gaurav Kampani,
"From
Existential to Minimum Deterrence: Explaining India's Decision to Test" |
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India's
Draft Nuclear Doctrine |
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The Nonproliferation Review, P.R. Chari,
"India's
Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions" |
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NTI, Gaurav Kampani,
"Seven Years After the Nuclear Tests: Appraising South Asia's Nuclear
Realities" |
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The Nonproliferation Review, Maleeha Lodhi,
"Security Challenges in South Asia" |
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Stimson Center, Rahul Roy-Chaudhury,
"Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control" |
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Gaurav Rajen,
"Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: Managing Nuclear
Operations and Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War" |
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