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State
Sponsorship
UN inspectors at work in central Iraq
 errorists
seeking to use
chemical or
biological weapons would not necessarily operate in isolation.
At least in theory, a state-sponsor that possesses chemical or
biological weapons could give them to a terrorist group to carry out
a proxy attack on a third party. Some argue that even
a
"rogue state" would be prepared to accept the loss of control
and the severe risk of retaliation associated with this scenario, but a government with a powerful opponent that wishes to distract that opponent by enhancing the capabilities of terrorists might consider sharing weapons, materials, or know-how with sub-national groups.
Another way that
terrorists could jumpstart their acquisition of unconventional weapons is to recruit CBW experts formerly employed by a state-level
program. This threat is particularly worrisome with respect to the
successor states of the former Soviet Union. During the late 1980s, the
Soviet biological warfare program employed roughly 60,000 scientists,
technicians, and other personnel on the development, weaponization, and
production of biological weapons. After the breakup of the Soviet Union,
some of these scientists were recruited by states seeking biological
weapons, such as Iran. In an effort to address this problem of "brain
drain," the United States, Japan, the European Union, and other
governments are providing peaceful research grants to former Soviet
weapons scientists through the International Science and Technology
Centers established in Moscow and Kiev.
The threat of "brain drain" is not
limited to the former Soviet Union. Former CBW scientists in South
Africa and Iraq are currently unemployed or underemployed and could be
tempted by high salaries or other inducements to sell their deadly
expertise to wealthy terrorist organizations. To date, however, no
evidence exists (at least in the public domain) that former state-level
CBW scientists have provided assistance to terrorists.
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