Chapter 6

Central and Eastern Europe

The creation of a NWFZ in Europe has been considered several times since the 1950s. Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki first proposed the establishment of a NWFZ in Europe in 1958. His idea is generally considered to be the origin of the concept of NWFZs. However, since both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries  relied on nuclear weapons for their defense and security strategies, this idea remained a non-starter during the Cold War.

Discussions of a European NWFZ resurfaced as the Cold War concluded and the global military balance shifted dramatically. In 1990, Belarus submitted a proposal encouraging the creation of a Central and Eastern European NWFZ that would stretch from the Baltic to the Black Sea, encompassing three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Belarus, and Ukraine. Later, in addition to these countries, the proposed NWFZ was expanded to include the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Moldova. However, few countries besides Belarus supported the idea in the 1990s.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Belarus submitted a working paper again advocating the creation of a Central and Eastern European NWFZ. The proposal noted that the prerequisites for such a zone, such as "the de facto absence of nuclear weapons from the region, strict compliance by all the states of the region with the NPT obligations, strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the region by concluding Additional Protocols with the IAEA and others," were already present. Nevertheless, most of the countries Belarus proposed for inclusion in the zone saw joining NATO and the European Union (EU), rather than creating a NWFZ, as more important for their security and economic development. Faced with the expansion of NATO and the EU to the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, even Belarus lost interest in a Central and Eastern European NWFZ, and the idea had all but died by 2001.

 

Chapter 6, page 5 of 5

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