History of Radiological Incidents

lthough anxiety has recently increased over potential radiological terrorist attacks, history has seen very few actual attempts at radiological terrorism. Threats have been made and evidence of plans has been found, but we still have yet to experience disastrous consequences from a radiological attack. Below are some previous cases of radiological incidents.

1982

        Rodney Wilkinson, a white South African, is recruited by the African National Congress (ANC) to sabotage the Koeberg nuclear power station in South Africa. At that time, the ANC was trying to topple the South African Apartheid system. As an employee of the station, Wilkinson is able to easily obtain access and place two Soviet-designed limpet mines near the reactor heads. The explosions were designed to not breach the reactor heads, according to a published interview with Wilkinson. The objective of the sabotage appears to have been to cause economic damage to the Apartheid regime but to not discharge harmful radiation.

1987

Photo Credit: IAEA
Contaminated rubble from a demolished house in Goiania, Brazil.

  • Iraq allegedly tests a radiological weapon, but considers it a failure because the weapon does not generate high radiation levels.
  • A canister of radioactive cesium-137 powder is inadvertently opened and the powder is passed around a community in Goiania, Brazil. The radioactive contamination results in four deaths, thousands of people being monitored, and economic losses adding up to hundreds of millions of dollars. See the multimedia section for more details.

1993

  • The Russian mafia allegedly places gamma ray-emitting pellets in the office of a Moscow businessman, resulting in the man's death.

1995

Photo Credit: FSB
Chechen leader
Shamil Basaev.

  • In November, Chechen rebels partially bury a container with a small quantity of cesium-137 in Moscows Ismailovsky Park. The Chechen leader then notifies a Russian television crew, which locates the container. This is the first widely reported incident of radiological terrorism. See the multimedia section for more details.

1996

Photo Credit: Ministry of Atomic Energy, Russia
Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant

  • In June, John J. Ford, Joseph Mazzuchelli, and Edward Zabo are arrested after discovery of their plot to put radium in the food, cars, and toothpaste of three politicians in Long Island, New York.

 

  • In the fall, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency is warned of a planned attack on the Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant by an armed group of Chechens. The threat is one of a series made since 1991, and is considered credible. Russian special forces are placed on alert and security around nuclear facilities increase, but the attack never takes place. See the multimedia section for more details.

1998

  • In March, 19 small tubes of cesium are reported missing from a locked safe in a Greensboro, North Carolina hospital. The tubes were to be used for cancer treatment, and are only three-quarters of an inch long by one-eighth of an inch wide. The incident is deemed as a theft by individuals trained to handle the highly radioactive material. The cesium has not been recovered.
  • In December, the Russian-backed Chechen Security Service announces the discovery and defusing of a container hidden near a railway line that was filled with radioactive materials and attached to an explosive mine. Chechen rebels involvement is suspected because of the proximity (10 miles) between the bombsite and a known Chechen explosives workshop.

1999

  • In September, unidentified thieves attempt to steal a container housing 200g of radioactive material from a chemical factory in Grozny, Chechnya. One of the thieves dies half an hour after being exposed to the container. The other is hospitalized in critical condition. Each carried the container for only a few minutes. Chechen officials do not publicly identify the radioactive materials.

 

Chapter 3, page 1 of 3

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.