The agency has published a number of guidelines, codes, and technical documents with recommendations on safety and security measures for nuclear facilities. These are meant to help ensure the safety of the people and environment in which nuclear reactors are located. New and revised guidelines are being developed to target specific areas where security improvements are needed or where new threats have been identified. Some of these areas include protection against insider sabotage of nuclear facilities, methods to identify sections that are critical to the operation and safety of each nuclear facility (“vital” areas), and ways to develop and maintain current and realistic threat assessment plans.

In 2008, the IAEA issued a nuclear terror prevention guide, “Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material.” It contains recommendations on how to prevent, detect, and respond to possible nuclear or radiological attacks, and it calls for cooperation among agencies and governments in dealing with such a threat.

In addition to its radiation safety and security publications, the IAEA conducts a number of international, national and regional training workshops for nuclear authorities. These workshops cover physical protection measures, threat assessment plans, emergency response measures, and other relevant areas. An important assessment system, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), is also organized through the IAEA. IPPAS teams are made up of international and national physical protection experts. Countries voluntarily invite IPPAS teams to visit their nuclear facilities and evaluate their respective nuclear regulatory system. The team then recommends ways for the country and its facilities to improve protection measures. Details and results of each IPPAS mission are kept confidential. But this service allows participating countries to learn from each other's and from the IAEA nuclear security expertise and experiences.

The general safety and security standards for radioactive sources are listed in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS for short). The BSS requires radioactive source owners to track and secure the sources to prevent theft or damage. To help countries stay in line with the BSS, the IAEA assists countries in establishing regulatory bodies and improving existing regulatory agencies that can inventory and monitor radioactive sources. It provides forums in which countries and international experts can exchange ideas and practices. The IAEA also provides advice on domestic laws, and education and training for radiation safety and customs officials. In addition, the IAEA recently updated its list of radioactive sources, now organized into categories to reflect their potential danger level and to indicate appropriate security measures. These initiatives are part of the IAEA updated plan of action to combat nuclear and radiological terrorism.

There are several international agreements that countries can abide by as one way to publicly demonstrate their commitment to preventing dangerous acts using radioactive material. These include the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct, for short) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). In July 2003, an intergovernmental working group completed revisions to the Code of Conduct to further address the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The IAEA Board of Governors approved these revisions in September 2003. Although the Code of Conduct is not a legally binding instrument, as of May 2008, 92 countries had expressed their support for it. Similarly, the CPPNM is undergoing revisions to better address security concerns. After many years of failed attempts, on July 8, 2005, delegates from 89 countries agreed to strengthen the CPPNM. A shortcoming of the original CPPNM was that it only applied to physical protection during the international transport of nuclear material intended for peaceful use. By expanding this narrow focus, the amended CPPNM “makes it legally binding” for parties to the convention “to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic peaceful use, storage as well as transport,” according to the IAEA. However, the improved CPPNM will not come into effect until two-thirds of the 112 parties ratify the amendments. The ratification process is expected to take several years.

Also as part of its updated plan of action, the IAEA has stepped up its efforts in working with other international organizations and national governments to locate and secure orphaned radioactive sources. On June 12, 2002, the IAEA, the United States and Russia signed an agreement to locate, recover, and secure the radioactive sources that pose the greatest danger. At the March 2003 International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources, then-U.S. DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham announced an expansion of this tripartite program. As a result of this expansion and the earlier work, several missions have been carried out in countries of the former Soviet Union, and more are scheduled in countries outside of this region.

In May 2004, then-DOE Secretary Abraham launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The GTRI combined under one umbrella program the previously separate programs of the Offsite Source Recovery Project, work to secure high-risk radioactive sources in about 40 countries, and efforts to secure nuclear fissile materials at research reactors and related facilities in dozens of countries. GTRI partners include the United States, Russia, the IAEA, and countries where radioactive and nuclear materials require additional security. Under the GTRI, the United States and Russia are initiating a cooperative program to secure radioactive sources in Russia, enhance radioactive materials protection at Russian laboratories, upgrade security at radioactive source disposal facilities, and keep weapons experts employed in peaceful pursuits.

The IAEA also helps countries address the challenge of radiological terrorism. For example, the IAEA helped Qatar adopt national laws to deal with security concerns raised by the country’s planned nuclear power program. Qatar established the legal framework for the development of a radiological monitoring system. Using this system, Qatar will track sources entering the country with radiation monitors at land border crossings, airports, and seaports. In preparation for the 15th Pan American Games in 2007, the IAEA provided Brazil with equipment and training for safeguards against radiological attacks, and leads on potential illicit trafficking of radioactive materials in the region. Similarly, the IAEA helped China prepare for a possible radiological bomb attack at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. The IAEA assistance included training in detection and tracking of radioactive materials.

International Cooperation

National governments are increasingly working together to establish greater safety and security for radioactive sources around the world. In March 2003 the International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources was attended by more than 700 delegates from over 100 countries. The conference was sponsored by the United States and Russia and organized by the IAEA. Participants discussed and exchanged ideas and information on additional security measures, ways to prevent illegal smuggling of radioactive sources, and appropriate responses to RDD use. The conference's main findings emphasized the importance of the BSS and the Code of Conduct. The conference also called for an international effort to locate, recover and secure orphaned sources throughout the world.

At a follow-on conference in 2005 in Bordeaux, about 300 delegates from 64 countries assembled to focus on creating a sustainable system of regulatory controls, dealing with the legacy of past activities that resulted in numerous orphaned sources, preventing illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, and preparing emergency first-responders to manage the consequences of an RDD attack.

Governments and international organizations are not the only ones working to prevent radiological terrorism—the legitimate users of radiation sources are trying to do their part, as well. In the United States, licensed source owners are taking steps to abide by the additional security guidelines issued by the NRC after September 11, 2001, despite the costs associated with increased security. Some users are also looking at adopting alternatives to radioactive sources, where possible. For example, during an April 2003 international meeting of radioactive source producers and distributors, participants discussed possible ways to phase out radioactive cesium-chloride, which poses a higher security risk because of its easily dispersible powder form.