What Else Should be Done?

While the threat of radiological terrorism cannot be completely eliminated, there are steps that can be taken to minimize this threat. If adequate monetary and human resources are provided, and efforts are focused on the most dangerous radioactive sources, the risk of terrorists obtaining and using these sources can be greatly reduced. And continuing efforts to increase security in and around nuclear facilities can further decrease the potential for a successful attack on a nuclear power plant. The following steps are among the recommendations that experts have suggested to address these threats.

Radiological Terrorism Using a Radiological Device:

• Maintain and improve proper regulation and security controls over high-risk radioactive sources. This is particularly important in the small group of nine countries that make up the majority of radioactive source producers.
• Maintain strong regulatory controls in the developed countries and provide assistance to improve regulatory systems in lesser-developed countries. The IAEA, in particular, is continuing its assistance efforts. Further assistance may be required for countries that are not members of the IAEA, but the means to provide this assistance is, in general, lacking.
• Promote a strong international security culture for radioactive sources. For example, encourage more countries to abide by the recently revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
• Tighten controls on imports and exports of the high-risk radioactive sources to verify that these sources will be used for peaceful purposes and will be subject to proper control and monitoring.
• Continue to provide training and equipment to strengthen border and port security. Properly trained and equipped customs officials can help to prevent illegal smuggling of dangerous sources.
• Intensify programs to sweep up unwanted radioactive sources before they are abandoned. Step up efforts to locate and secure those high-risk sources that have already been orphaned.
• Create incentives for proper disposal of disused, or unwanted, sources. For example, if a disposal fee is charged when a user first purchases a radioactive source, part of the fee can be refunded when the user shows proof of proper disposal after the source has been used.
• Create permanent, secure regional, national, and international disposal sites for highly radioactive sources.
• Continue efforts to find non-radioactive (or lesser-radioactive) alternatives to high-risk sources, making radioactive sources harder to scatter, and other technical advances that might decrease the security risk.
• Increase awareness of the threat of radiological terrorism and appropriate responses through education of the public and the media.

  Hot Spot Mobile lab used for detailed radiological analysis of samples collected at incident sites.

• Provide proper training and equipment to emergency responders—not only those in the first line of defense, such as emergency medical technicians, but also to local and federal officials who will respond to an attack.
• Continue research and development of technologies for protection, detection, and monitoring of radioactive sources, and for decontamination in case of a terrorist attack.

Attacks on Nuclear Facilities:

• Encourage all countries that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
• Update threat assessment plans in countries with operational nuclear power plants to reflect the post-September 11th threats of terrorist attack and insider sabotage. This includes states other than the United States and its allies, since terrorists may choose to strike at lesser-protected targets.
• Conduct consistent and realistic mock attacks to find security vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities. This is particularly important for countries with operational nuclear power plants. Countries that do not have experience in this area could receive assistance from other countries or from the IAEA.
• Make greater use of the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS). Increasing the knowledge base of successful national security measures and systems will increase the service’s effectiveness and benefit participating countries.
• Encourage establishment by the IAEA of a confidential database on the state of physical protection for nuclear materials and high-consequence nuclear facilities around the world. This database could be used to identify the facilities most in need of security improvements.
• Thoroughly complete background checks—and particularly criminal history checks—before unescorted access is granted. Requiring security cameras or the "two-person" rule inside all vital areas would also help to decrease the risk of insider sabotage.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.