Fact Sheet

Taiwan Missile Overview

Taiwan Missile Overview

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Background

This page is part of Taiwan’s Profile.

Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC), develops and deploys advanced ballistic and cruise missile technologies, and is largely dependent on the United States for ballistic missile defense systems.

Taiwanese companies have historically been involved in illicit exports and transshipments of dual-use items to Iran and North Korea. 1 Today, Taiwan’s export control system encompasses adherence to the MTCR Annex and relevant guidelines for granting export permits. 2 Due to its contested political status Taiwan cannot formally participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or other multilateral nonproliferation agreements.

While many of Taiwan’s missile programs and capabilities remain secret, four overarching issues illustrate the program’s strategic rationale. First, Taiwan’s objectives are to deter and delay potential invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which retains its claims to the island and has not renounced the possible use of force to resolve the issue. Taiwan’s “deterrence equation” takes into account how long it would take the PRC to overcome Taiwanese air defenses, the losses the PRC would incur in achieving that goal, and how long it would take for the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense. 3 Second, historically Taiwan’s missile programs benefitted from U.S. and Israeli designs and technology, but since rapprochement between the United States and the PRC, Taiwan has become more independent in its missile design and manufacture. Third, as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have become more controversial in U.S.-PRC relations and in Taiwanese politics (namely budget debates), the United States has increasingly emphasized sales of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems instead of offensive weaponry. Finally, the United States has successfully pressured Taiwan to halt the development of medium- and long-range missiles capable of delivering WMD. As Taiwan’s qualitative advantage in fighter aircraft decreases, Taiwan is reviving longer-range cruise missile programs to improve its deterrence capabilities.

Capabilities

Taiwan deploys some short-range ballistic missiles and a growing number of cruise missiles. Taiwan’s former minister of national defense, Tsai Ming-hsien, reported Taiwan has been developing intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) since 2008. 4 According to the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense (MND), Taiwan currently possesses the Tien-Chien I and II missile systems. 5 In addition to IRBMs, Taiwan developed anti-ship missiles including the Hsiung Feng-I, -II, and -III. 6 The capability to deny air superiority to an invading force is also a priority, for which Taiwan has invested heavily in surface-to-air missiles, including the Tien Kung series.

Missile Tables for Taiwan

The Taiwanese military is currently increasing and upgrading its ballistic missile defense capabilities, and by 2015 will have 10 batteries capable of firing either Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2/GEM or PAC-3 missiles, with 32 PAC/GEMS or up to 128 PAC-3s per battery. 7 Currently, Taiwan is beginning production of the Yun Feng, a mid-range missile with a range of 1,200 km that could eventually be extended to approximately 2,000 km. 8

History

1964 to 1996

Shortly after the PRC’s first successful nuclear test in 1964, Taiwan’s President Chiang Kai-shek ordered the establishment of the Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST). 9 Completed in 1968, CSIST’s mission is the development and production of defense technologies, including missiles. 10

In 1969, the Nixon Doctrine underlined the concept of allies bearing more responsibility for their own defense, and in 1972 the Shanghai Communiqué signaled rapprochement between the United States and the PRC. 11 After becoming Premier in 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo altered Taiwan’s military procurement emphasis in response to this changing security environment. 12 Following China’s successful satellite launches, in 1976, CSIST began the Qingfeng Jihua (Green Peak Program) for short-range missiles, completing plans for the Qingfeng missile in 1979, and debuting the missile in a 1981 military parade. 13 Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems notes the design similarities between the Qingfeng missile and the U.S. MGM-52 Lance missile, as well as potential connections to Israel’s Gabriel 2 technology. 14 Around the same time, Taiwan began developing its Hsiung Feng missile based on Israel’s Gabriel technology. On 4 October 1978, the Taiwanese military publicly claimed it had successfully tested the Hsiung Feng missile, subsequently displaying the system in Taiwan’s National Day Parade on 10 October. 15

In the 1980s, Taiwan was concerned that the PRC would obstruct U.S. sales of advanced weapons systems, and thus began to develop indigenous production capabilities for such systems. 16 The United States shifted diplomatic relations to the PRC in 1979, terminated the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980, and pledged to “reduce gradually” its arms sales to Taiwan in the 1982 Shanghai Communiqué. 17 Taiwan also began work on the Tien Chien air-to-air missile in conjunction with its Indigenous Defense Fighter program. 18

In the 1980s Taiwan also began research on the Tien Ma missile as a delivery vehicle for the nuclear weapon it was developing clandestinely. The Tien Kung missile was supposed to be the first step towards developing a missile capable of carrying a larger payload. 19 Ultimately, in June 1982 the United States successfully pressured Taiwan into cancelling the Tien Ma program. 20

1996 to the Present

Taiwans defense procurement priorities changed drastically after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which culminated in the PRC launching missiles near Taiwanese ports and the United States deploying two carrier battle groups to the region. 21 After the crisis, Taiwanese politicians, including Chen Shui-bian (who became president from 2000 to 2008), advocated an “active defense” strategy that could counter China’s missile capabilities, and target assets on the mainland and in transit through the Taiwan Strait. 22

Taiwan received its first Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2 systems (including missiles, mobile launchers, and multifunctional radar) in 1997, and deployed them around Taipei. 23 Upgrades to the PAC-3 system began in 2001. 24 In August 2009, the Taiwanese government agreed to the procurement of four PAC-3 systems in a deal worth U.S. $3.2 billion, including 264 PAC-3 missiles from Lockheed Martin, in addition to an existing U.S. $600 million contract with Raytheon to upgrade its three PAC-2 operational fire units to the PAC-3 standard system. 25

Taiwan also placed increased emphasis on its indigenous short- and mid-range missile programs. Before leaving office in 2000, Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui allegedly restarted the Tien Ma program (cancelled in 1982). 26 In June 2000, Chen Shui-bian put forth an “offshore full-scale engagement policy,” an active defense strategy including “surgical strikes” by “defense deterrent weapons systems.” 27 Under President Chen, CSIST developed weapons systems that increased Taiwan’s power projection capabilities across the Strait, including Wan Chien cluster munitions, the Tien Chien IIA anti-radiation missile, and the Hsiung Feng III high-speed anti-ship missile. 28 In December 2012, Taiwan’s Next Magazine reported on the secret development of the Yun Feng (Cloud Peak) missile, which utilizes a solid jet booster and ramjet engine, and with an estimated range of 1,200 km is capable of reaching Shanghai. 29

Taiwan’s development of longer-range missiles is controversial, with many U.S. officials and scholars arguing that these capabilities are destabilizing. In 2007, National Security Council Senior Asian Director Dennis Wilder stated that “offensive capabilities on either side of the Strait are destabilizing,” and that Taiwan should emphasize defensive capabilities. 30 Emphasizing these systems’ deterrent effect could lead to “neglecting genuine defense requirements, as well as instilling a false sense of confidence in [Taiwan’s] political leadership,” according to retired Admiral Michael McDevitt. 31 Although long-range missiles would be less vulnerable than Taiwan’s aircraft, demands for sufficient intelligence and U.S. concerns may affect Taiwan’s future decisions. 32

At an organizational level, Taiwan is in the process of consolidating its different missile command structures. In 2004, Taiwan established Missile Command (飛彈指揮部) to integrate anti-ballistic and air-defense systems, with eventual integration of offensive missile systems planned. 33 Systems under its control include the Hawk, the Tien-kung, the Patriot, and the Hsiung Feng missile systems. 34 Taiwan procures the Patriot and Hawk air-defense missile systems from the United States; Taiwan is developing the Tien Kung and Hsiung Feng systems indigenously. 35 According to a MND source, Taiwan will begin retiring the Hawk system in 2015 with the development of the new Tien Kung III system. 36 One Taiwanese official indicated in January 2013 that Missile Command’s 601 Group handles “offensive missile systems,” including the Hsiung Feng 2E. 37 The Yun Feng missile, once in production, will also reportedly be placed under Missile Command. 38 Missile Command is subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, who answers to the Minister of National Defense. 39

Recent Developments and Current Status

According to the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense (MND), Taiwan currently possesses the Tien-Chien I and II missile systems. 40 In addition to IRBMs, Taiwan developed anti-ship missiles including the Hsiung Feng-I, -II, and -III. 41 The capability to deny air superiority to an invading force is also a priority, for which Taiwan has invested heavily in surface-to-air missiles, including the Tien Kung series.

Taiwan’s deployment of the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile, the Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack cruise missile, and its development of the Yun Feng received considerable international scrutiny. In August 2011, the Taiwanese military displayed a model of its Hsiung-Feng III anti-ship missile, with a backdrop of a burning aircraft carrier resembling the PRC’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which had embarked on its maiden voyage earlier that same day. 42 The Hsiung Feng IIE became controversial after bloggers in the PRC discovered that Taiwan was deploying the missile in army vehicles described as commercial delivery service trucks. A Taiwanese military official described the decision as “idiotic” and “embarrassing.” 43 The missile has an estimated range of 1,000 km and carries a 200 kg payload, and as of July 2012 approximately 300 were deployed in northern Taiwan. 44

Taiwan’s Yun Feng missile was first revealed to the international community with Next Magazine’s December 2012 article. The missile’s development reportedly required ten years and over 800 million New Taiwan Dollars (~$27 million USD at the time), and Taiwan concealed its flight tests within the Hsiung Feng III test program. 45 Production of the missile may begin as soon as 2014, and if Taiwan extends the missile’s range from 1,200 km to 2,000 km Beijing would be within the missile’s range. 46 The exact status of the Yun Feng became a source of some controversy in Taiwan after former defense minister Michael Tsai published a book in which he claimed that the country had successfully completed the missile, and had test fired it at a military base in southern Taiwan in February 2008. 47 Shortly after the book’s publication, a media report citing anonymous military officials claimed that 50 of the missiles would be produced by the following year, to be deployed in the mountains in central Taiwan and aimed at military installations on China’s southeastern coast. 48 Other military analysts in the region have disputed this claim, arguing that the Yun Feng is a long-range anti-ship missile intended for use against invasion fleets. 49 According to Next Magazine’s article, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou sees the missiles as effective bargaining chips in any future cross-Strait negotiations. 50

In December 2013, the United States began its delivery of Harpoon anti-ship missiles to Taiwan. 51 The delivery is a part of a US$195.48M arms deal between the United States and Taiwan that began in 2008 and will conclude in 2016.

In early 2014, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense (MND) announced its acquisition of “36 submarine-launched Harpoon Block II anti-ship cruise missiles…32 UGM­84L encapsulated all­up rounds, two UTM­84L exercise missiles, two UTM­84XD certification and training weapons, and two weapon control systems,” according to Jane’s Navy International. 52 This new acquisition is expected to significantly increase the capabilities of the Republic of China Navy’s two diesel-electric submarines, extending the striking range of the submarines from 15 nautical miles (as equipped with SUT torpedoes) to a maximum range of 150 nautical miles when equipped with the UGM-84L missiles. 53

In January 2014, Taiwan’s Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) showcased 71 upgraded Ching-Kuo Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF/F­CK­-1) at the Tainan air base. 54 The upgrade equipped the Fighters with enhanced capabilities, including the ability to carry Wan Chien (Ten Thousand Swords) stand-off air-to-surface missiles. 55 The Wan Chien missile system will bolster IDF fleet by “increase[ing] combat effectiveness and [providing] the capability to strike airports, harbours, and missile and radar positions as well as concentrated targets without exposing the aircraft to anti­aircraft fire.” 56 The fighters are expected to be capable of carrying the Wan Chien missile system by early 2017. 57

Taiwan is now developing the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missile system, reportedly capable of intercepting short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and fighter jets. Development is scheduled to last until 2024. 58

During the August 2015 Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition Taipei exhibited two defense missile systems: the Sea Oryx short-range air defense missile system, which is able to carry up to 16 variant Tien Chien-1 missiles; and the TC-2N medium-range air defense missile system, which is able to fire Tien Chien-2 missiles. 59 Also at the Exhibition, officials of the Republic of China Navy presented information about the Tuo Jiang stealth corvette ship, the largest missile-equipped ship in the Taiwanese fleet, which is equipped with 16 anti-ship missiles, including Hsiung Feng II and III. Taiwan may build as many as eleven of these vessels in the near future. 60

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Glossary

Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Dual-use item
An item that has both civilian and military applications. For example, many of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons have legitimate civilian industrial uses, such as the production of pesticides or ink for ballpoint pens.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.
Multilateral
Multilateral: Negotiations, agreements or treaties that are concluded among three or more parties, countries, etc.
Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD)
All active and passive measures designed to detect, identify, track, and defeat incoming ballistic missiles, in both strategic and theater tactical roles, during any portion of their flight trajectory (boost, post-boost, mid-course, or terminal phase) or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness in destroying their targets.
WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Deterrence
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Patriot (PAC) Program
The Patriot, first deployed in 1984, is the U.S. Army’s air and missile defense system. The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) is the anti-theater ballistic missile defense component of the Patriot system.
Nuclear (use) doctrine
Nuclear (use) doctrine: The fundamental principles by which a country’s political or military leaders guide their decision-making regarding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons.
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Diesel-electric submarine
Diesel-electric submarine: A submarine with a diesel-electric transmission. Diesel-electric transmissions require access to oxygen for the diesel generator to charge the submarine’s batteries or drive the motor. This type of submarine is thus louder and must surface more frequently than a nuclear-powered submarine. A diesel-electric submarine can fire conventional cruise missiles against land targets, and in theory, can also carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Diesel-electric submarines are significantly cheaper to build and purchase than nuclear-powered vessels, which makes them the vessel of choice for smaller navies.

Sources

  1. See: Togzhan Kassenova, “Strategic Trade Controls in Taiwan,” The Nonproliferation Review, 2010, 17:2, pp. 391-394; Togzhan Kassenova, “Global Non-Proliferation and the Taiwan Dilemma,” Global Asia, 22 March 2012, via: http://carnegieendowment.org.
  2. Vann Van Diepen, “The Missile Technology Control Regime in U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy,” Remarks by the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, 30 July 2012, www.state.gov.
  3. See Ed Ross, “Taiwan’s Ballistic-Missile Deterrence and Defense Capabilities,” China Brief, Volume XI, Issue 3, 10 February 2011, p. 10.
  4. Ed Ross, “Taiwan’s Ballistic-Missile Deterrence and Defense Capabilities,” China Brief, Volume XI, Issue 3, 10 February 2011, p. 10.
  5. Ministry of Defense Republic of China [中华民国国防部], “Missiles” [國防自主成果專區, 自製飛彈], Online Missile Database, July 2014, www.mnd.gov.tw.
  6. Michael J. Lostumbo, “A New Taiwan Strategy to Adapt to PLA Precision Strike Capabilities,” in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott Harold, eds., New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), p. 133.
  7. Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Taipei’s Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Nuclear Weapons Development,” 1 November 1972, distributed by Central Intelligence Agency, Approved Release December 2001.
  8.  “Introduction Prospects of the Chung-Shan Institute, [中科院簡介與前景],” Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology, 31 October 2012, http://cs.mnd.gov.tw.
  9. Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” 3 November 1969, www.nixonlibrary.gov; “Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China,” 28 February 1972, www.taiwandocuments.org.
  10. Bernard Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects (New York, New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 27-28.
  11. Han Liu, “Taiwan Region’s Self-Manufactured Missile Copies [台湾地区自制武器扫描],” Maritime Spectacle [海事大观], Vol. II, 2005, pp. 36-43. Other scholars state CSIST completed the missile in 1980-see Wei-chin Lee, “Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 2001, pp. 4-5.
  12. “Ching Feng (Green Bee),” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 23 June 2005 (archived) www.janes.ihs.com.
  13. Cai Hanxun, “On 4 October 1978, Taiwan First Made Public Its Indigenously Developed Missile, [1978年10月4日台灣首次公開自製飛彈],” PTS News Network [公視新聞議題中心], 4 October 2011, http://pnn.pts.org.tw; “On 4 October 1978, Taiwan First Made Public Its Indigenously Developed Missile, [1978年10月4日台灣首次公開自製飛彈],” Taiwan Times, 4 October 2011, www.twtimes.com.tw.
  14. “Tien Chien II (Sky Sword 2),” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, 23 October 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
  15. Bernard Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects (New York, New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 27-28.
  16. “Tien Chien II (Sky Sword 2),” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, 23 October 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
  17. “Taiwan Has No Tien Ma Ballistic Missiles,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 23 September 2002, www.janes.ihs.com.
  18. Han Liu, “Taiwan Region’s Self-Manufactured Missile Copies [台湾地区自制武器扫描],” Maritime Spectacle [海事大观], Vol. II, 2005, pp. 36-43.
  19. For an account of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, see: Robert Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, Fall 2000, pp. 87-123.
  20. York Chen, “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance,” China Brief, the Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 9, Issue 23, 19 November 2009; Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, Taiwan, RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 148.
  21. Shirley Kahn, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research Service report RL30957, 29 November 2012, p. 8.
  22. “Taiwan > Procurement,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 31 October 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
  23. Han Liu, “Taiwan Region’s Self-Manufactured Missile Copies [台湾地区自制武器扫描],” Maritime Spectacle [海事大观], Vol. II, 2005, pp. 36-43.
  24. “Taiwan Pushing Ahead with SRBMs,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 13 December 2001, www.janes.ihs.com.
  25. “Wan Chien,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, 20 December 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
  26. “Taiwan’s Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功: (雲峰) 專案瞄準上海],” Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, pp. 51-56, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
  27. AIT Director Stephen Young, Press Conference, 3 May 2007, www.ait.org.tw.
  28. Michael McDevitt, “For Taiwan, the Best Defense is Not a Good Offense,” PacNet, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, #9, 22 February 2007.
  29. See Richard Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations, Brookings Institution Press, 2012.
  30. Brian Hsu, “Military Revamps Missile Command,” Taipei Times, 9 December 2003, p. 4, www.taipeitimes.com.
  31. Taiwan: Army, National Security and Defense Policy Handbook, Volume 1 (Strategic Information and Developments), International Business Publications USA, 2011, Washington, DC, pp. 223-224.
  32. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Working on New ‘Cloud Peak’ Missile,” Defense News, 18 January 2013, www.defensenews.com.
  33. “Taiwan’s Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功: (雲峰) 專案瞄準上海],” Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 53, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
  34. Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China, “中國民國壹百年, 國防報告書 [National Defense Report, Republic of China, 100th Anniversary]” 2011, p. 103.
  35. Ministry of Defense Republic of China [中华民国国防部], “Major Weapon Systems of the ROC Armed Forces — Army” [防空飛彈指揮部, 飛彈裝備], Online Missile Database, May 2015, www.mnd.gov.tw.
  36. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Retires Hawk Missiles,” Defense News, 15 September 2014, www.defensenews.com.
  37. Ministry of Defense Republic of China [中华民国国防部國防部單位], July 2014, www.mnd.gov.tw.
  38. “Military Acquires Submarine-Launched Harpoon Missiles,” Taiwan News, 2013, www.taiwannews.com.
  39. Ministry of Defense Republic of China, [中华民国国防部國防部單位], July 2014, www.mnd.gov.tw.
  40. Ministry of Defense Republic of China [中华民国国防部], “Missiles” [國防自主成果專區, 自製飛彈], Online Missile Database, July 2014, www.mnd.gov.tw.
  41. Michael J. Lostumbo, “A New Taiwan Strategy to Adapt to PLA Precision Strike Capabilities,” in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott Harold, eds., New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), p. 133.
  42. Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s Red Bird Express Service, Rain or Shine,” Intercepts, 27 February 2013, http://blogs.defensenews.com.
  43. “2Hsiung Feng I/II/IIE/III (HF 1, 2, 2E, 3),” Jane’s Naval Weapon Systems, 31 May 2013.
  44. “Taiwan’s Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功: (雲峰) 專案瞄準上海],” Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 56, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
  45. “Taiwan’s Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功: (雲峰) 專案瞄準上海],” Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 55, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
  46. “Taiwan Defence Ministry Mum on Medium-range Missile Development Issue,” Central News Agency (CNA) [Taiwan], via BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 March 2013.
  47. “Taiwan to Aim 50 Medium-range Missiles at China: Report,” Agence France Presse, 18 March 2013.
  48. Wendell Minnick and Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan, Taiwan Upgrade Strike Capability,” Defense News, 7 May 2013, defensenews.com.
  49. “Taiwan’s Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功: (雲峰) 專案瞄準上海],” Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 55, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
  50. Taylor, Guy and Maggie Ybarra, “Taiwanese Resist U.S. System to Detect Chinese Missiles, Officials Say,” The Washington Times, 6 June 2014, www.washingtontimes.com.
  51. “World Navies: Taiwan,” Jane’s World Navies, 13 May 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
  52. “US Began Delivery of Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles in 2013: MND,” China Post, The (Taiwan), 2013, www.chinapost.com.tw.
  53. Phipps, Gavin, “Taiwan Announces First Drills to Feature New US Kit,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 April 2014.
  54. Phipps, Gavin, and J. Michael Cole, “Taiwan Unveils Upgraded IDF, Wan Chien Stand­off Missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 January 2014.
  55. Phipps, Gavin, and J. Michael Cole, “Taiwan Unveils Upgraded IDF, Wan Chien Stand­off Missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 January 2014.
  56. Rahmat, Ridzwan, Gavin Phipps, and James Hardy, “Taiwan Receives Anti-ship Missiles,” Jane’s International Navy, 2014.
  57. J. Michael Cole, “Taiwan Sends Not-So-Subtle Signal on China’s Carrier,” Taipei Times, 11 August 2011, www.taipeitimes.com.
  58. “Taiwan Develops New Missiles To Counter China’s Threat,” Defense News, 2 December 2014, www.defensenews.com.
  59. “Taiwan Defense Show Exhibits New Weapons,” Missile Threat, 12 August 2015, missilethreat.com.
  60. Klevin Wong, “Taiwan Highlights New Features, Further Development for Tuo Jiang Stealth Corvette,” IHS Jane’s 360, 19 August 2015, www.janes.com; “Taiwan’s Largest Missile Ship Goes into Service,” Defense News, 31 March 2015, www.defensenews.com.

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