First Review Conference of the CWC: Coming of Age

Introduction

The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was held from April 28-May 9, 2003 in The Hague, The Netherlands. The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997 and since its inception, its membership has increased from 87 to the current number of 153 States. The review conference was attended by 113 States Parties, with Haiti and Israel participating as signatory states, and Libya and Angola being accorded observer status. Five international organizations, 22 NGOs, and six industry associations were approved by the Conference as participants. The CWC has strengthened international efforts to eliminate the threat of a chemical weapons attack. This has been accomplished through the work of its own verification regime, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was held from April 28-May 9, 2003 in The Hague, The Netherlands. The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997 and since its inception, its membership has increased from 87 to the current number of 153 States. The review conference was attended by 113 States Parties, with Haiti and Israel participating as signatory states, and Libya and Angola being accorded observer status. Five international organizations, 22 NGOs, and six industry associations were approved by the Conference as participants. The CWC has strengthened international efforts to eliminate the threat of a chemical weapons attack. This has been accomplished through the work of its own verification regime, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

In accordance with Article VIII of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (CWC), State Parties held the First Review Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from April 28-May 9, 2003 in The Hague, The Netherlands. The CWC prohibits the acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons and is the first multilateral treaty that requires the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction within a fixed time frame. The objective of the review conference was to review the operations of the Convention as provided for in Paragraph 2 of Article VIII, while taking into consideration any relevant scientific and technological developments, as required by paragraph 26 of Part IX of the Verification Annex. The Review Conference is a unique opportunity for States Parties of the CWC, as well as the Technical Secretariat—which assists the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions, including carrying out the verification measures provided for in the Convention—to examine the implementation and evaluate the overall operations of the CWC during its first five years. After evaluating past operations, Review Conferences offer a chance to stay the course or provide a new strategic direction for the future of the OPCW, an opportunity not typically afforded during regular meetings of the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council.

The Review Conference began with a general debate segment during which 52 nations delivered national statements. Three nations presented statements on behalf of groups of states: Nigeria (on behalf of the African Group), Greece (on behalf of the European Union and acceding and associated countries, and of the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway), and Malaysia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and China). The United States took the opportunity during its opening statement to name both member and non-member states as possessors or future possessors of chemical weapons: it accused Libya, Syria, and North Korea (all non-States Parties) of actively seeking to acquire chemical weapons, and categorized Iran and Sudan (States Parties) as being in noncompliance with the treaty. Iran exercised its right to reply, calling the allegations baseless and further advising the United States delegation to behave more maturely by helping the Conference to succeed by encouraging non-States Parties to accede.

This initial bickering at the Review Conference did not continue during the substantive negotiations, allowing the State Parties to move forward and eventually approve a Political Declaration and Review Document, which provide a road map for activities of States Parties and the Technical Secretariat for the next five years.

Political Declaration

The 23-paragraph Political Declaration reaffirms States Parties commitment to achieving the objectives of the Convention, including universality, disposal of abandoned chemical weapons, and the conversion of production facilities. In addition, the Political Declaration also emphasizes the need for further enhanced international cooperation, including collaboration with other relevant international and regional organizations, promotion of free trade in chemicals, as well as international cooperation and the exchange of scientific and technical information. While noting the progress made in chemical disarmament, the declaration welcomes the cooperation of States Parties to assist possessor States in meeting their chemical destruction deadlines.

Review Document

The Review Document provides a detailed assessment of the implementation of specific provisions of the Convention during its first five years. The document focuses on the CWC’s role in enhancing international peace and security, measures to ensure universality of the treaty, obligations towards declarations and verification, and inspections of chemical weapons and industrial facilities. The Review Document takes into consideration scientific and technological developments, therefore noting that the chemical industry should adapt its verification regime in a manner that maintains its effectiveness and relevance. The Document urges the OPCW and States Parties to resolve outstanding verification issues, noting that a number of procedures and guidelines that the Convention requires remains to be finalized.

Issues Highlighted at the Review Conference

SCHEDULED CHEMICALS: The Review Document notes that all Schedule 1 facilities have been subject to systematic inspections, and requested the Council to study the issue of transfers of Schedule 1 chemical and, if agreed, to prepare a proposal for consideration by the Conference at one of its forthcoming annual sessions. In regards to the inspection of Schedule 2 chemicals facilities, the Review Document notes that nearly all initial inspections have been conducted. The Conference urged all States Parties to implement provisions for transfers of scheduled chemicals, including the enactment of necessary legislation and the sharing of experiences about the implementation of these provisions. The Review Conference also addressed the issue of transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States Parties to the CWC. The Report of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties concluded that all States Parties should take the necessary measures to ensure full implementation of the Convention’s requirement for end-use certification by recipient non-States Parties. The Conference requested the Executive Council to submit a recommendation to the next Session of the Conference of States Parties.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: The Scientific Advisory Board concluded that in the future, it may be necessary to amend the schedules of chemicals because of the increase in the knowledge about toxic chemicals and toxins, the growth in the number of chemical compounds, and issues related to novel agents—toxic chemicals that had not been considered at the time negotiations on the CWC were concluded. The Director-General, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter of Argentina, recognized the proliferation concerns, noting that at this time, expanding the number of schedules may not be the best approach. He further emphasized the need for the OPCW to be aware of new chemicals, and for States Parties to have confidence in the effectiveness of the Convention. The Director-General noted that the number of unscheduled chemicals that could cause harm has increased significantly and warned that with recent developments in science and technology, the only way of detecting violations in the future may be through challenge inspections.

CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS: Clarification from States Parties about compliance, including those issues not resolved during routine inspections, may be addressed through challenge inspections. A paper submitted by the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland during the Review Conference concluded that challenge inspections should serve as a deterrent in order to restore confidence in compliance and as an enforcement measure to ensure proliferators are exposed. Another paper submitted to the Conference by the Hellenic Republic on behalf of the European Union concludes that challenge inspections are of increasing importance given the sophistication and flexibility in chemical production resulting from the technological advances in chemistry and chemical engineering. Even though the importance of challenge inspections was reflected in the papers and national statements submitted during the Conference, neither the Political Declaration nor the Review Document adequately addressed the issue of how to depoliticize challenge inspections in order to make them a viable mechanism for verifying compliance.

CW DESTRUCTION: To date, the OPCW has achieved success determining the whereabouts of existing chemical weapons stockpiles among its member states. States Parties to the Convention have declared 8.6 million chemical munitions containing more than 70,000 tonnes of toxic chemical agent to the Secretariat. States Parties have declared 61 chemical weapons production facilities and those not already destroyed before entry into force of the Convention have been deactivated. The Report to the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention notes that the four possessor States (United States, Russian Federation, South Korea, and India) are committed to meeting their destruction obligations but recognized that some of these States will experience delays and be granted extensions. The Review Conference recognized the need to further enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the verification measures and encouraged States Parties to provide assistance to others, upon request, in the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles and destruction facilities. As of April 28, 2003, Russia had been able to complete only 1 percent of its Schedule 1 chemical weapons destruction and has been granted a five-year extension to 2012 to complete 100 percent of the destruction. The United States has destroyed 23 percent of its Schedule 1 chemical weapons and India has destroyed 20 percent of its chemical weapons arsenal. South Korea has destroyed 1 percent of its Schedule 1 chemical weapons, and the OPCW has granted South Korea an extension on its 20 percent deadline.

UNIVERSALITY: Although 153 States Parties have joined the CWC, much work still needs to be done in the area of universal adherence to the Convention. In addition to the three non-States Parties that the United States mentioned in its opening statement as seeking to acquire chemical weapons—Libya, Syria, and North Korea—the Report to the First Session of the Conference of the States Parties claims that many more states of concern remain outside the treaty.

The most recent additions to the CWC are Tonga, Timor Leste, Andorra, and Guatemala. While these States are welcomed additions to the treaty, States such as Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Libya remain outside the treaty. The Review Conference noted with concern that a total of 43 States are not Party to the Convention, 25 States have signed but not yet ratified the treaty, and 18 States have not signed.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: The Review Document re-emphasized the right of States Parties to use chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. A major incentive for States to join the CWC is possible access to chemical technology and chemical expertise through the OPCW’s international cooperation projects, including the Conference Support Programme, the Internship Support Programme, the Laboratory Assistance Programme, and the Equipment Exchange Programme. The Conference of States Parties in October 2002 recognized the growing importance of the OPCW’s activities in the area of international cooperation and has increased the provisions of its budget by 12.4 percent for 2003. The opening statement at the Review Conference, delivered by Marian Hobbs, New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, challenged the OPCW to connect the ultimate aim of the elimination of chemical weapons with OPCW’s international cooperation programs, emphasizing the need to support and develop these programs before they lose their effectiveness and political support.

The Conference also stressed the importance of actively investigating alleged use of chemical weapons, stressing the need to be ready at all times to support follow-up action by the OPCW and member states. The Report of the Conference notes the establishment of the Assistance Coordination and Assessment Team (ACAT)—the overall function of which had yet to be defined, but which has been tested in assessment mode in exercises—and stressed the need for the coordination of ACAT with other international organizations.

Prospects for the Next Five Years

The OPCW has faced many challenges since its creation five years ago, enduring an ongoing budget crisis, dealing with requests for extension of chemical destruction deadlines by chemical weapons possessor states, and maintaining cohesion during the removal of its first Director-General, José Bustani. The removal of Bustani in April 2002 distracted the Secretariat and polarized the States Parties. The current Director-General, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter of Argentina, has provided stability for the Organization since assuming the post in July 2002.

The destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles is the most urgent outstanding issue that needs to be addressed. Russia and South Korea have already requested extensions and all indications are that the United States will also request an extension. Albania recently stated that it possesses a chemical weapons stockpile, and the OPCW will soon begin the process of destroying its stockpile; information on the size and content of Albania’s stockpile is not publicly available.

The Review Document also recalls the need to resolve a number of outstanding issues, several of which are urgent and long-standing, such as the increasing number of so-called non-lethal chemical weapons, ranging from riot control agents to chemical incapacitates. Several States Parties raised the issue of non-lethal agents in their opening statements but neither the Political Declarations nor the Review Document adequately addressed this issue.

The accusations of noncompliance by the United States towards Iran and Sudan, along with recent reports by the Scientific Advisory Board regarding the increase in scientific and technological developments, will make challenge inspections an even more critical verification mechanism. However, if a challenge inspection is not requested in the near future, this mechanism, which was originally intended to enhance the verification regime of the OPCW, may lose its credibility and ultimately become ineffective in deterring treaty violations.

Resources

Articles and Reports

• First Review Conference, CWC, Political Declaration, www.opcw.org.
• First Review Conference, CWC, Review Document, www.opcw.org.
• Kerry Boyd, "Albania Has Chemical Arms; CWC Review Conference Meets," Arms Control Today, June 2003, www.armscontrol.org
• Alexander Kelle, "CWC Report, The CWC After Its First Review Conference: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?" The Acronym Institute, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 71, June-July 2003, www.acronym.org.uk.
• Michael Moodie and Isabelle Williams, "The CWC Review Conference: Issues and Opportunities, Special Report 6," CBACI, April 2003
• "Where to From Here? The First CWC Review Conference and the Next Five Years," The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 60, June 2003

Websites

• Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), www.opcw.org.
• James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, https://cns.miis.edu.
• U.S. Chemical Weapons Convention, www.cwc.gov.