Pakistan Biological Overview

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Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, and ratified it in 1974. ¹ Although it has a well-developed biotechnology research and development infrastructure, there is no evidence of any Pakistani program to develop, produce, or stockpile biological weapons or agents.

Since the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Defense has assessed that Pakistan “has the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting research and development relating to biological warfare.” ² However, the United States government has not alleged that Pakistan has any intention of using dual-use capabilities to develop biological weapons. In the wake of Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed sanctions on a large number of entities related to nuclear and missile proliferation, as well as four chemical and biological facilities: the Center for Advanced Molecular Biology, Lahore; Karachi CBW Research Institute; Karachi CW & BW Warfare R&D Laboratory; and the National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, Faisalabad. ³ However, the United States lifted the sanctions in 2001, and there is no indication that any of these companies has engaged in offensive biological weapons research or development. ⁴

During BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistani representatives have urged more robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the treaty, and, as part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), argued in favor of guaranteeing states’ rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for scientific research. ⁵ Pakistan has a patchwork of existing legislation to implement its obligations to the BTWC, as detailed in its reports pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. ⁶ In a statement to the BTWC Review Conference in 2011, Pakistan announced that it had drafted legislation that would “comprehensively prohibit designing, development, manufacturing, stockpiling, transport, import, export, sale, acquisition and possession of biological agents and toxins including their means of delivery.” ⁷

Pakistan’s biotechnology sector has continued to expand in recent years, with dozens of institutions dealing with biotechnology and genetic engineering. Of greater proliferation concern than a dedicated BW program is the possibility that dangerous dual-use biological materials from these facilities could be inadvertently exported or fall into the hands of state or non-state actors as a result of possible weaknesses in Pakistan’s export control and biological security systems. Since the mid-2000s, Pakistan has increased its regulation of the biological industry, issuing a set of biosafety rules in 2005 which established a National Biosafety Committee to create guidelines, issue export licenses, and inspect facilities dealing with “living modified organism[s] or genetically modified organisms.” ⁸ Islamabad has also taken measures to improve its WMD-relevant export controls. In 2004, the government released the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate exports of biological, nuclear, and missile-related products. ⁹ An updated control list, released in 2011, brought Pakistan’s biological export controls in line with those of the Australia Group (AG), although Pakistan remains outside the Group. ¹⁰

In 2015, the US State Department found that there was no indication that Pakistan was out of compliance with its BTWC commitments. ¹¹